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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS ON TRADE AND WELFARE: THE 
CASE OF EU SHRIMP IMPORTS 
This research explores the link between a gravity model and welfare frameworks and 
then applies the quantitative model system to analyze how trade and welfare is affected 
by the Minimum Required Performance Limits (MRPL) in the shrimp importing market 
of European Union.  
The quantitative model system consists of two parts: first, this study uses the “phi-ness” 
gravity model to investigate the trade effects of MRPL on EU shrimp market. The “phi-
ness” gravity model partitions the standard variables to avoid biased estimation caused by 
the correlation between time and country fixed effects and policy variables. The Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method is incorporated into the estimation in 
order to control for the zero valued observations.  
Second, based on the theoretic foundation of the gravity model, this research sets up the 
specific nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) model of consumers’ utility and 
further explores the linkage between these two models. The nested CES model 
incorporates the effects of MRPL on consumers’ confidence in domestic food as well as 
foreign food imported from developed and developing countries.  
The empirical results confirm a consistent fact with previous empirical studies: stricter 
MRPL has significant and negative effects on trade integration between EU and trading 
partners with lower level of food safety standards. The welfare analysis shows that the 
zero tolerance policy of MRPL standard would dramatically enhance consumers’ demand 
for domestic shrimps and foreign shrimps imported from developed countries but reduce 
the quantity of shrimp supplied from developing countries. It is also indicated that the 
increased level of MRPL lead to an increase in welfare of domestic consumers, suppliers 
in developing countries, and in total international trade, as well as a decrease in the 
welfare of domestic suppliers and foreign suppliers from developed countries. 
The empirical results also indicate that the combination of GM and Welfare Approach can 
also be applied to research on other standards or other industries.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Food safety regulation issues are becoming increasingly important in the arena of 
international seafood trade. In order to protect their domestic consumers from potential 
health hazard, such as the residue of misused pesticide and antibiotics in seafood, most 
nations have standards to ensure the higher food safety. Since no country has jurisdiction 
over production outside of its borders, a country can regulate the products produced or 
entering its borders. Consumers therefore consume not only food from abroad, but also 
the different services of other countries’ food safety regimes (Mitchell, 2003). As the 
desired level of hazard detection differs, the desired level and form of food safety 
regulation may vary among countries. In this case, suppliers might confront the difficulty 
to comply with multiple safety regimes in domestic and aboard. In reality, the differences 
among food safety standards are even more remarkable between developed countries and 
developing countries, as the latter often lack necessary machinery or techniques to reach 
the same level as the former (Baylis, Nogueira and Pace, 2011). 
The effects of regulations are ambiguous and complex to determine. On one side, 
regulations are often necessary to improve the market benefits of increased consumer 
confidence in safer products and the public health benefits of safer food. But on the other 
side, strict regulations can affect international trade by increasing the costs of imports or 
prohibiting them entirely. The imposition of domestic standards may raise the cost of 
foreign supplies relative to domestic production. Requirements of compliance with 
importers’ standards may effectively prohibit imports from countries that lack adequate 
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regulatory infrastructure, even if some foreign firms can meet importers’ standards. In 
addition, when the government adopts stricter safety regulations than necessary and the 
possibility of hazard or threat to food safety is small, the strict regulations could cause 
welfare losses for both trading partners due to trade reduction (Mitchell, 2003). Such 
costs from reduced trade must be balanced against the benefit of safer goods. It is the 
balance of such costs and benefits among countries that makes the measures of regulation 
so controversial in international trade. 
This research focuses on EU shrimp market and measures the impact of a stricter 
standard, Minimum Required Performance Limits (MRPLs), to control the residues of 
chloramphenicol on EU shrimp market. The EU has explicitly specified the level 
requirement of MRPL on chloramphenicol. Products that contain chloramphenicol 
beyond the level set by MRPL are rejected. The standard strictness depends on the level 
of MRPL set by EU --the lower the level, the stricter the standard. In this case, this 
research treats the strictness of food safety standard as the level change of MRPL. One 
purpose of this article is to quantify how the level change of MRPL influences the EU 
shrimp trade between two disaggregated country groups and the welfare changes of EU 
consumers and both domestic and foreign suppliers.  
After taking into account the differential origins and corresponding different levels of 
food safety standards, EU shrimp trading partners are classified into two categories: 
developing countries and developed countries. It is hypothesized that the imposition of 
the strict regulation has negative effects on the aggregated EU trade flows. It is also 
hypothesized that the regulatory effects on trade flow differ by country categories. This 
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research tests these two hypotheses by using a gravity model estimated by the ratio of 
bilateral trade over domestic trade, and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) 
method to deal with heterogeneity and zero observation problems.  
This research adopts a combination of gravity equation and welfare approach to estimate 
the regulatory effects on welfare changes. By integrating the coefficient measuring the 
standard effects on trade via the gravity equation, this research determines the relative 
variations of both prices and quantities in the nested CES model used for welfare 
analysis, and evaluates the welfare changes of consumers and suppliers. This combined 
model allows policy makers/researchers to measure the impact of the stricter standard on 
domestic producers’ and consumers’ surplus, and the welfare of foreign exporters in 
developed and developing countries. 
This research makes an important contribution to the literature on the effects of regulation 
on trade by linking the theoretical foundation of the monopolistic competition gravity 
model (GM) by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) with the nested CES model of 
consumer and supplier behavior. Many recent empirical assessments measure the effects 
of regulation on trade via gravity estimation (i.e. Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Disdier, 
Fontagné, and Mimouni 2008; Anders and Caswell 2009). Other papers develop a welfare 
approach without gravity estimations (i.e. Yue and Beghin 2009). The combination of 
gravity and welfare methodologies has been overlooked by those studies. Only a few 
studies explicitly remedy this absence, such as Disdier and Marette (2010). 
However, existing papers just combine the GM estimation function with a quadratic 
function for demand and supply without considering the foundation of connection. The 
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combination of the GM and welfare approach is unpersuasive in the absence of a linkage 
between the GM’s economic foundation and demand and supply functions. This 
dissertation verifies the specific form of the utility function in order to use the GM for 
welfare analysis and explores the theoretical linkages between the CES utility functions 
and the GM. Since the derivation of the GM is based on the CES model, the improved 
CES model is more appropriate for the combined method used in an empirical work. 
The second contribution of this dissertation is to differentiate welfare changes from food 
safety standards based on the economic status of exporters. Conceptual studies show that 
stricter standards have different effects on trade from developed and developing 
countries. These differences may in turn indicate different changes to suppliers or 
consumers in countries with different economic status. However, this discrimination is 
overlooked by many empirical researches. This dissertation accounts for the 
heterogeneity among imported shrimp products from different exporters and provides a 
new way to quantify the welfare changes among countries with differing economic status. 
The third contribution of this dissertation is to estimate the welfare variations caused by a 
stricter standard for shrimp products in the EU. The approach used in this research differs 
from the previous seafood studies that focus only on the ex post evaluation of trade 
effects, or on the evaluation of welfare effects via econometric analysis. In this research, 
a methodology is provided that not only evaluates the existing policy, but also anticipates 
the effects of policy changes with an ex ante analysis linked to the changing level of 
chloramphenicol residues in seafood. This welfare study helps anticipate demand and 
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supply changes of markets and achieves quantified analyses directly usable by the public 
decision makers. 
1.2 Background of Shrimp Market and Food Safety Standards 
1.2.1 World Shrimp Market 
World shrimp production, as show in Fig. 1-1, has expanded steadily over the past 
decades. The capture of shrimp increased from 1.6 million metric tons to 3.3 million 
metric tons in 2003 and has stabilized around its 2003 level (Josupeit, 2004). Yet 
production of shrimp through aquaculture has kept on growing faster since 2003. 
 
Figure 1-1. World Shrimp Production Trend 
 
Trade in shrimp also has expanded significantly since the early 1980s in response to the 
increase of aquaculture shrimp production (Keithly and Poudel, 2008). As shown in 
Figure1-2, world exports of fresh and frozen shrimp expanded from 897 million pounds 
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in 1980 to 4.1 billion pounds in 2003. The nominal world shrimp price has fallen 
significantly during the mid-1980s and after 2000. 
 
Figure 1-2. World Export Quantities and Nominal Price of Shrimp 
 
A marked shift materialized during this period with a growing functional distinction 
between shrimp-consuming developed countries and shrimp-producing developing 
countries. Three regions - Asia, Central America and South America – account for about 
80% of world shrimp production (Poudel and Walter, 2008). EU, Japan and the U.S. are 
the main shrimp importing countries, which together consume 60% of world production 
and absorb 80% of these worldwide exports (Debaere, 2010). As Debaere (2010) states, 
the causes of the dominant role of developing countries in fish aquaculture are well 
understood. Shrimp farming requires waterfront property that in many developed 
countries has higher value in other uses. In addition, water pollution and the destruction 
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7 
general, that shrimp farms are moved to the coasts of Asia and Latin America where 
waterfront property is more affordable, labor is cheaper and environmental laws are less 
stringent. 
The boom of shrimp trade has also brought health concerns to consumers. Shrimp 
farming is risky. First, the crop is largely determined by weather and ecological 
conditions. Second, shrimp culture is also quite vulnerable to diseases that can severely 
reduce crops (Debaere, 2010). In this case, developing countries, which are the major 
exporters, use a range of pesticides and antibiotics (such as chloramphenicol) to prevent 
and treat bacterial infection (Marette and Beghin, 2010). These chemicals are highly toxic 
to human health.  
The major importers enforce stricter sanitary criteria on detecting antibiotics and 
chemicals in order to protect their domestic consumers. Studies have shown that the very 
low levels of antibiotics are safe for human health. In order to determine the point at 
which a hazardous substance presents a health risk, experts developed the concept of the 
maximum residue limit (MRL), which is the amount of residue considered to have no 
significant risk for human health. In the case of chloramphenicol, the level of MRL varies 
widely among countries. In Japan, the MPL for chloramphenicol is defined as 50 ppb. In 
the United States, this level is defined as 5 ppb. The EU enforced a much stricter standard 
than other countries and defined the level at 0.3 ppb based on MRPL (Global Aquaculture 
Alliance, 2011). 
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1.2.2 EU Shrimp Market 
Shrimp imports into Europe have continued to grow during last ten years. The 
predominant form is frozen as listed in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2.  
Table 1-1. Frozen Shrimps Imported into EU-28 from 2000 to 2010 
Year Commodity  Netweight (kg) Value ($) Unit Value ($/kg) 
2000 Frozen Shrimp 286356510 1890986129 6.60 
2001 Frozen Shrimp 327093638 1871817532 5.72 
2002 Frozen Shrimp 342081104 1706788162 4.99 
2003 Frozen Shrimp 406897414 2307749883 5.67 
2004 Frozen Shrimp 399807299 2278066270 5.70 
2005 Frozen Shrimp 430273945 2459801418 5.72 
2006 Frozen Shrimp 487027455 2953573545 6.06 
2007 Frozen Shrimp 492456664 2941823536 5.97 
2008 Frozen Shrimp 466173640 3086425813 6.62 
2009 Frozen Shrimp 468998653 2727229869 5.82 
2010 Frozen Shrimp 476193317 3082202769 6.47 
 
The value and volume of imports of frozen shrimp into the EU were highest between 
2006 and 2008. From 2006 to 2010 the volume of frozen shrimp increased by 13.5 
percent, while import volumes of live shrimp and prawns kept almost stable.  
 
 
9 
Table 1-2. Non-frozen Shrimps Imported into EU-28 from 2000 to 2010 
Year Commodity  Netweight (kg) Value ($) Unit Value ($/kg) 
2000 Non-frozen Shrimp 3090984 15015138 4.86 
2001 Non-frozen Shrimp 3064257 18116873 5.91 
2002 Non-frozen Shrimp 4164280 22635821 5.44 
2003 Non-frozen Shrimp 5427797 31786939 5.86 
2004 Non-frozen Shrimp 3945479 24008235 6.08 
2005 Non-frozen Shrimp 3323470 20138248 6.06 
2006 Non-frozen Shrimp 3048174 24026508 7.88 
2007 Non-frozen Shrimp 3062874 21591045 7.05 
2008 Non-frozen Shrimp 5114530 51962594 10.16 
2009 Non-frozen Shrimp 2037760 17179007 8.43 
2010 Non-frozen Shrimp 1470574 15118771 10.28 
 
Compared with the U.S. and Japan, the EU imports shrimp of a much lower unit value. 
This can be explained by the fact that the EU imports a lot of coldwater shrimp, generally 
smaller and lower priced than tropical shrimp (Poudel and Walter, 2008). 
The EU mainly imports shrimp products from Asia, South America and other locations 
such as Southeast Africa and Greenland in Europe. Figure 1-3 presents the top ten 
exporters of shrimp into the EU-28 in terms of value from 2000 to 2010. Countries in 
South America lead shrimp exports before 2005 and Asian countries dominated the 
market thereafter. 
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Figure 1-3. Top Ten Exporters of Shrimp to EU-28 
 
Europe is a very heterogeneous market with significant differences from country to 
country. Consumers in northern Europe tend to prefer cold-water shrimp while those in 
southern Europe like warm-water shrimp. The two main warm water shrimp species 
imported into the EU are Giant tiger prawn and White leg shrimp (CBI, 2010). Figure 1-4 
shows the share of the top importing countries in the EU. In terms of value, Spain is the 
major importer of shrimp and prawns, accounting for more than 30 percent of all imports 
on average, followed by the France (19%), Italy (12%), Belgium (12%), and United 
Kingdom (10%).  
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Figure 1-4. Imports of Shrimps per Countries Share in EU 
 
1.2.3 EU Food Safety Regulation 
The EU has established a list of non-member countries that grant approval numbers to 
fish companies certifying that the companies adhere to the food safety rules and, 
therefore, are allowed to export to the European Union. Countries on the list are 
confronted with public standards and private standards in the EU. Public food safety 
standards for imports of fishery products from non-EU member countries have been 
driven by the EU rules and regulations, which are mandatory. Exporters who do not 
comply with public regulations could not enter the border of EU member states. The 
private standards required by retailers, such as European System Related to Good 
Agricultural Practice (EUREPGAP), British Retail Consortium (BRC) and Safe Quality 
Spain
33%
France
19%
Italy
12%
Belgium
12%
United Kingdom
10%
Denmark
7%
Germany
6%
Other
1%
Imports of Shrimps per Countries Share in EU
(Share of total average import value from 2000 to 2010)
 
12 
Food (SQF), now are applied by supermarkets and importers all over the world to 
coordinate supply chain activities and control for food safety (Henson, 2008). 
For the fish sector, retailers have few private guidelines for food safety and quality. 
Instead national public regulations are used as a guide for safe and high-quality food. The 
reason is that the retail market share of fish is still much lower than that of other products. 
The wholesale markets are still leading shrimp selling (Willems, Roth and Roekel, 2005). 
In this case, this research only concentrates on the effects of public regulations in the EU. 
When the products arrive at the point of entry in the EU, national agencies control the 
products on public food safety regulation aspects. Regarding the shrimp products, the 
national inspection service samples and checks the entries and rejects those lots that do 
not comply with the standards. The major food safety problems encountered for shrimp 
products are microbiological contaminants, residues of antibiotics, metal contaminants, 
and parasites. Prohibited use of antibiotics has caused major problems in recent years 
(Willems, Roth and Roekel, 2005).   
In the EU as well as in other markets, chloramphenicol and nitrofuran are banned 
antibiotics in seafood productions. The EU has refused many contaminated consignments 
in order to protect their consumers. In 2001, after detecting high levels of 
chloramphenicol residues, the EU tightened testing for chemical residues and banned any 
shipment containing the antibiotic in all shrimp imported from Indonesia, China and 
Vietnam (Ababouch, Gandini, and Ryder, 2005). In January 2002, the EU imposed a 30-
month ban on shrimp imports from China because of illegal antibiotic use. They started 
to import Chinese shrimp again in July 2004, only after the Chinese government 
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guaranteed that it would test 100% of shrimp exports. In 2007, EU imposed a ban on Thai 
shrimp contaminated with chloramphenicol and decertified all seafood producers from 
Pakistan (Disdier and Marette, 2010). 
In order to protect consumers and ensure the food imported from other countries safe to 
eat, the EU applies the MRPL for several substances prohibited or not authorized in food-
producing animals, which is the “minimum content of an analyte in a sample, which at 
least has to be detected and confirmed” (European Commission, 2003). MRPL was first 
used in the official documentation of Commission Decision 2002/657/EC. It was 
originally used to develop an analytical method that can reliably and repeatedly confirm 
the present level of banned substances at concentrations in the food of animal origin. In 
the Commission Decision 2002/657/EC, the MRPL concept did not include any provision 
for a specific level of action. Nowhere is it stated that the lowest concentration of a 
banned substance requiring effective enforcement action is XX µg/kg. The EU sets up the 
level of substances after 2003. In effect MRPL acts as a "cap" on the worst performing 
methods to ensure that a minimum standard was applied across EU members’ laboratories 
(Kennedy, 2004). If the presence of banned substances at concentrations is confirmed to 
be equal to, or below, the MRPL, it would be deemed fit for the purpose of consumption. 
For the special case of chloramphenicol, the EU experienced a changed policy on MRPL 
requirements. Due to the outbreak of chloramphenicol in shrimp imported from Asian in 
2001, the EU enforced a zero tolerance policy to all shrimp products entering EU 
countries. Laboratories found it infeasible to uphold a zero tolerance policy (Hanekampet 
al, 2003). Therefore, the EU shifted from zero tolerance and regulated chloramphenicol at 
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the MRPL level of 0.3 ppb when the European Commission published a decision on 11 
January 2005 (Commission Decision, 2005). Moreover, the EU destroyed the affected 
imports to prevent contamination within its food chain. Only as the EU was revising its 
zero-tolerance policy, did it consider the possibility of re-exporting or returning the 
shrimp with low levels of contamination (Debaere, 2010). 
The intention of MRPL requirements in the EU is to protect consumers. But the stricter 
sanitary criteria raise the cost to both domestic and foreign suppliers and reduce the 
amount of shrimp supply to consumers, which may result in net consumer losses. In 
addition, governments spend more time and money on sampling and detection of 
imported shrimps. Thus, the overall effects of stricter standards on trade and welfare 
change are worthwhile to quantify for policy makers in the EU. 
1.3 Illustrations of MRPL on EU Shrimp Market 
The effects of standards on consumers and suppliers are complicated to determine. This 
section provides the theoretical foundation of stricter standard effects and discusses the 
possible changes to market equilibrium, and the shifting and rotating of demand and 
supply curves caused by the stricter standard enforcement. 
Whether domestic and foreign consumers can benefit from stricter standards is hard to 
determine. With regulation it is possible that consumers could gain greater utility from 
consuming high-quality products and thus would be more willing to pay a higher price 
(Huang, Kan and Fu, 2000). However, the extent of food safety is hard to observe. If the 
public is not aware of a food safety concern prior to implementing regulation or is 
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unaware of the increased magnitude in safety, the regulation might not result in an 
increase in demand for safer products (Korinek, Melatos and Rau. 2008). In addition, the 
situation is more complex if international trade is introduced. Countries usually ban foods 
that do not meet the requirements of food safety regulations. Foreign suppliers need to 
adjust to stricter standards in order to ship products into importers’ border. If the foreign 
producers cannot provide safer food as cheaply as domestic firms, consumers can benefit 
from the ban by consuming safe food at lower prices. However, if foreign firms could 
provide food that is cheaper and safe, consumers lose from a ban (Mitchell, 2003).  
Compliance with standards can influence producers in several ways. First, in satisfying 
regulatory requirements, firms invariably incur additional production costs (i.e., labelling, 
testing, certification, etc.), or marginal costs (i.e., upgrade facilities) (Korinek, Melatos 
and Rau. 2008). Second, the standards may reduce the proportion of foreign products 
entering a market because of tougher inspections linked to stricter thresholds, particularly 
for suppliers in the developing countries that have difficulties complying with the stricter 
standards of developed countries (Disdier and Marette, 2010). All these effects contribute 
to the reduction of the quantities supplied by farmers and tend to increase the resulting 
equilibrium prices. 
As stated before, this dissertation defines the strictness as the level change of MRPL. The 
EU actually relieved the strict standards by increasing MRPL from zero to 0.3 ppb in 
2005. In order to explore the effects of strict standards, this research measures the welfare 
based on two scenarios with different levels of MRPL and then compares the difference 
between the welfares under these two scenarios. The initial scenario reflects the current 
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set of MRPL for chloramphenicol, which values at zero from 2002 to 2004 and at 0.3 ppb 
since 2005. The new scenario considers the effects of sticking MRPL at the zero level in 
2005 and thereafter. MRPL regulation is stricter in the new scenario. 
 
Figure 1-5. The effects of standards on demand and supply curves of the EU 
 
Figure 1-5 shows the possible impacts of stricter regulations on demand and supply of 
domestic and foreign shrimp products in the EU market. As this research measures the 
effects of MRPL level changes, index 0 and 1 reflect the situation before and after 
lowering the MRPL standard. The price P is located on the vertical axis, and the quantity 
Q is shown along the horizontal axis. DD and DI are the demand curve of domestic and 
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foreign shrimp products in the EU. SD and SI respectively represent the domestic and 
foreign supply of the EU. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that all the information on improved food safety has been 
passed on to consumers after implementing the MRPL requirement. All foreign suppliers 
are required to comply with the EU’s food safety standards before they export shrimp to 
the EU countries. It is assumed that domestic suppliers already incorporate the MRPL 
standard and the domestic supply curve is not affected by enforcement of the MRPL 
standard. This was the case with the new 2002 policy that impacted mainly Asian 
exporters, since chloramphenicol was already banned in the EU since 1994 (Disdier and 
Marette, 2010).  
The domestic products and foreign products are assumed to be not perfect substitutes. As 
the EU already banned the substance of chloramphenicol before 2000, domestic products 
always follow the requirement of zero tolerance policy; while foreign products comply 
with MRPL setting at 0.3 after 2005. In this case, for the initial situation, the price of 
domestic product PD0 is assumed to be a little higher than the price of foreign product PI0 
as domestic products actually comply with the higher level of standard. The heterogeneity 
of domestic and foreign products reflects the different level of standard. After reducing 
the MRPL level, both domestic and foreign products meet the zero level of MRPL. The 
products are deemed to be identical and both domestic and foreign suppliers confront the 
same price P1. 
For the initial situation 0, QD0 and QI0 are domestic output and foreign output in figure 1-
5 respectively. The welfare corresponds to the area PD0A0E0 for domestic producers and 
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PI0I0C0 for foreign suppliers. The surplus of domestic consumers corresponds to the area 
B0E0PD0+F0I0PI0. The total domestic welfare is the sum of domestic producers’ surplus 
and consumers’ surplus, which is the sum of areaa B0E0A0 and F0I0PI0. The total 
international welfare is the sum of domestic welfare and foreign suppliers’ surplus and is 
given by F0I0C0+B0E0A0. 
With this initial situation proceeding to a stricter MRPL regulation, the market allocation 
is modified as represented by the red curves and new equilibrium points of E1 and I1 in 
red. A stringent standard increases consumer confidence in provided shrimp products and 
stimulates demand for domestic and foreign goods. The domestic demand curve shifts 
upward from D0 to D1, leading to an increased domestic price P1>PD0 and an increased 
domestic quantity demand QD1> QD0.The upward movement of foreign demand curve 
also leads to an increase in price and quantity of foreign goods at equilibrium. Moreover, 
the reduction of the MRPL level increases foreign producer costs and induces the foreign 
supply curve to shift upward. This movement offsets the effects of increased demand on 
quantity and pushes the price further to P1. Whether the foreign quantity at equilibrium 
after reducing MRPL level increases or not, i.e., QI1>QI0, depends on the extent of the 
foreign supply curve changes. If the foreign supply curve SI1 shifts farther away from the 
original one, SI0, the effects of supply curve would outweigh the effects of the demand 
curve shift and QI1 would be less than QI0. 
When the stricter standard is reinforced, the welfare also changes at the new equilibrium 
point. The consumers’ surplus changes to B1I1P1+B1E1P1, the domestic supplier surplus 
increases by P1E1E0PD0 and the total domestic welfare increases to the B1E1A0+ F1I1P1. 
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The foreign supplier surplus changes to PI1I1C1 and the international welfare is 
F1I1C1+B1E1A0. 
The effects of MRPL are demonstrated by the comparison between the initial welfare and 
the new welfare and are hard to determine. If B1I1P1+B1E1P1> B0E0PD0+F0I0PI0, then 
consumers benefit from reducing MRPL level. If B0E0A0+F0I0PI0is larger than B1E1A0+ 
F1I1P1, the increase in foreign supply price PI is small enough for the stricter regulation to 
be beneficial to the domestic country. Alternatively, B0E0A0+F0I0PI0 could be smaller than 
B1E1A0+ F1I1P1, when the stricter regulation induces a relatively large contraction in 
foreign supply. In this case, additional regulation would result in domestic welfare losses, 
since the damage to consumer welfare caused by a reduction in quantity and increase in 
price offsets the increase in domestic supplier surplus. In addition, foreign suppliers 
would suffer by stricter standard if PI1I1C1 is smaller than PI0I0C0. 
The analysis above suggests that changes in the foreign supply curve caused by 
tightening the MRPL are crucial to determine the effects of MRPL. When the stricter 
MRPL causes a large reduction in foreign supply that overcomes the increase in foreign 
supply price (i.e., P1*QI1<PI0*QI0) and if the difference between P1*QI1and PI0*QI0 is 
large enough, both foreign suppliers and the EU would suffer from welfare loss. The 
expression PI*I represents the nominal value of shrimp products provided by foreign 
suppliers. The relationship P1*I1<PI0*I0 indicates that if the tighten of MRPL dramatically 
reduces the nominal imported value from foreign suppliers, the domestic welfare of the 
EU and foreign supplier surplus would reduce. In other words, the significance of MRPL 
effects on foreign trade flows indicates the welfare changes. 
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1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation has the following organized structure: in this chapter, the motivation of 
this dissertation and the background of the world and EU shrimp production and trade are 
introduced. The theoretical basis of welfare analysis is also illustrated in this chapter. In 
chapter two, the mainstream of research methodologies and the empirical results about 
the stricter standard effects are summarized. In chapter three, the model system adopted 
in this dissertation and the model in the case study of the EU shrimp market are specified. 
Then the estimation results and changes of trade flows changes and welfare are analyzed 
in chapter four. At last, the conclusions about the method applied in this research and the 
evaluation of the MRPL standard in the EU and their implementation are presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Impact of Stricter Standard 
During the last few decades, many researchers have tried to quantify the effects of stricter 
food safety standards on international trade and welfare changes. Based on different 
objectives, those researches can be classified into two categories: trade effects and 
welfare effects. 
2.1.1 Effects on Trade Flows 
During the last decades, various private standards are increasingly dominating the 
improvement of food safety and quality controls. In the basic commodity markets, public 
standards continue to be the principle mode of the governments. Across the high value 
agricultural and food products markets, private standards are increasingly the dominant 
driver (Henson, 2008). However, the mainstreams of empirical researches still focus on 
the effects of public standards on international trade. In principle, researchers may 
analyze the impacts of private standards in a similar way as public standards, and indeed 
it has been suggested that the distinction between these two regimes in the trade setting 
can be over-emphasized (Henson 2008; Henson and Humphrey 2010). However, isolating 
the trade effects of a particular private standard or the impacts on particular country 
product exports is made more difficult due to the lack of data and the firm specific nature 
of these standards.  
Research on the effects of public food safety standards on trade has often focused on two 
contrasting views: whether food safety standards are “catalysts” or “barriers”. Henson 
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and Steven (2008) and Jaffee and Jabbar (2005) highlighted the potential benefits 
provided by stricter emerging standards. Tighter standards not only provide certain 
countries with a competitive advantage and increased shares from stringent standards, but 
they also provide incentives for developing-country producers to adjust their export 
industry; these adjustments could benefit poor country consumers through strengthened 
food and health standards. Caswell and Bach (2007) pointed out the possible spillover 
effects on consumers, but they show that such spillover effects are weak in their case 
study of Brazil.  
The view of “standards as barriers” holds that many developing countries do not have 
effective food safety control systems in place, so the stricter safety standards imposed by 
major developed- country importers impede trade flows through the creation of 
prohibitive costs of compliance (Grant and Anders 2010; Anders and Caswell 2009; 
Caswell and Bach 2007). A fairly extensive literature provides empirical evidence for the 
negative effect of stricter standards on trade. For example, Anders and Caswell (2009) 
found that as a group, developing countries suffered significant trade reduction under 
HACCP enforcement in the U.S. However, based on a country-specific picture, larger or 
more established seafood exporters (even those in developing countries) increased their 
trade flows while smaller exporters suffered reductions. Nguyen and Wilson (2009) 
analyzed the product-specific impacts of strict standards by investigating the EU, the US, 
and Japanese markets and found that the trade impact of food safety standards is negative 
and significant, but differentiated across seafood products. Shrimps appear to be the most 
sensitive to changing food safety policies, while fish is the least sensitive. 
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2.1.2 Effects on Welfare Changes 
Regarding the shrimp market, Hudson, et al (2003) examined the effects of a potential 
ban on shrimp imports by the United States from countries non-complying with the Turtle 
Excluder Device system. They estimated a linear expenditure system to obtain the own-
price elasticity of demand for shrimp imports. They find that such a ban would generate a 
welfare loss for U.S consumers. The magnitude of the effect depended on whether lost 
imports from banned countries were reallocated to other countries. However, the research 
of Disdier and Marette (2010) shows a different story. By focusing on the crustaceans 
trading markets in the U.S., EU, Canada and Japan, they found that although the stricter 
standards showed a negative impact on crustacean imports to these four countries, a 
stricter standard led to an increase in both domestic and international welfare because of a 
significant reduction in chloramphenicol damage.  
Most research assumes that all analyzed countries are small and do not account for 
potential changes in world price caused by stricter standards. Calvin and Krissoff (1998) 
suggested that standard enforcement in big countries could result in changes of world 
prices. In this case, the corresponding tariff equivalent (TE) calculation (one 
methodology used for measuring trade effects) and welfare analysis could potentially 
overestimate. Debaere (2010) focused on the shrimp market and showed that the EU’s 
trade policy (especially strict standards on antibiotic residues compared to the ones 
applied by the U.S.) significantly impacted the world shrimp market and shifted exports 
away from Europe towards the U.S. in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the added 
consequence of depressing U.S. prices for shrimp. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
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no study has incorporated large country effects on the world market into the calculation 
of welfare changes. 
2.2 Research Methodologies 
Generally speaking, existing econometric methods of empirical research can be divided 
into two groups: ex ante or ex post econometrics. Ex post analyses typically focus on the 
past measures and trade flows. The econometric models estimating the relationship 
between standards and trade normally adopt ex post analysis based on historical trade 
data. In contrast, ex ante analyses concentrate on future potentials and are generally 
employed to predict the likely impact of a regulatory change before it is introduced. This 
usually involves simulating a partial or general equilibrium model to determine how 
individual consumers and producers would respond to price changes arising from a 
change to the regulatory environment. 
2.2.1 Ex Post Method 
The gravity equation is widely used as an ex post method to quantify the trade impacts of 
standards and other non-tariff measurements (NTM). The gravity model explains bilateral 
trade flows with the distance between trade partners, their size and some resistance 
factors (including a quantitative measure of standards). The coefficient of the regressor 
representing standards or NTM quantifies the effects of the standards or NTM on bilateral 
trade flows. This method shows great power in explaining factors influencing bilateral 
trade. Researchers using a gravity model analysis have adopted a number of different 
approaches, reflecting the lack of agreement on the best way to measure standards.  
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Some studies incorporate frequency and coverage measures of standards to estimate trade 
impacts, that is, whether standards are trade-restricting or trade-promoting. Frequency 
measures count the number of regulatory measures within a given product classification 
and coverage measures are usually expressed as a percentage of the total imports in that 
product category or tariff line (Rau and Schueter 2009). For example, a binary choice 
variable is used and is assigned the value of one if a country-pair, product, and year 
specific trade flow is subject to a regulatory measure, and zero otherwise. For example, 
Anders and Caswell (2009) corporated the dummy variable of identifying the 1997 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point regulation (HACCP) into gravity equation 
and evaluated the trade impact of HACCP on U.S. seafood imports.  
In order to calculate the effects of NTM, Fontagné, von Kirchbach, and Mimouni (2005) 
used NTM notification data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) to calculate 
the import coverage index which is the ratio of notifying country imports to total world 
imports.  
The main drawback of frequency and coverage measures is the assumption that the 
greater the number of restrictions and the broader their application, the larger the likely 
restrictive impact on trade. In fact, standards are complex and impact different products 
in different ways. There is little agreement in the literature on how to weight the 
importance of different standards in calculating an aggregate measure of their impact on 
trade (Korinek, Melatos and Rau. 2008). The combined gravity models with frequency 
and coverage measures usually cover a wide range of products and standards, as well as 
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technical regulations, under the broad category of NTMs. Most studies estimating the 
trade impact of multiple regulatory measures in econometric models rely on frequency 
and coverage ratios. 
Many studies have employed the gravity model to directly measure the stringency of 
regulations and standards. The stringency of regulations and standards can be measured 
directly if the standard or NTM contains the elements such that they can be ranked on a 
quantitative scale, for instance regulations and standards defining tolerance maximum 
levels for residue and contaminants. These studies tend to focus on specific cases of 
standards for particular products and countries. For example, Otsuki, Wilson and 
Sewadeh, (2001) estimate the impact of a maximum residue level for Aflatoxin on trade 
of cereals and fruits, nuts and vegetables from Africa to the EU. The drawback of the 
direct method measuring the stringency is the difficulties in directly assessing the 
stringency measures. Not all of standards or regulations provide such quantitative 
elements that can be used directly as stringency measures. 
Some academics contribute to indirectly measure the stringency of regulations and 
standards by calculating the Tariff Equivalent (TE). The TE provides an ad-valorem 
equivalent of standards that are directly comparable with tariffs. In order to obtain the TE, 
academics estimate the quantity impact of regulations and standards on trade via gravity 
model and then transform the quantity effect, via elasticity, into a price effect, which is 
referred to TE. Disdier, Fontagné and Mimouni (2008) used a gravity model to estimate 
TE in this way. 
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2.2.2 Ex Ante Method 
The welfare approach estimates the welfare change from standards based on the 
traditional simulation model by explicitly depicting the shifting of demand and supply. 
The costs and benefits for producers and consumers are introduced in the model 
equations, and the simulation exercise subsequently models the producer and consumer 
behaviors in response to changing requirements. Model parameters and assumptions are 
important, but how regulations and standards are depicted in the model also determines 
the simulation results. On the demand side, regulations and standards are reflected by 
consumers’ willingness to pay for certain product characteristics which are provided by 
regulatory measures. On the supply side, simulation models usually depict regulations 
and standards as additional costs that producers incur when complying. Welfare changes 
are normally estimated by partial equilibrium models.  
Among the papers implementing welfare changes analysis, two research papers have 
made important contributions. Liu and Yue (2009) incorporated the heterogeneity of 
consumers’ preferences between domestic and imported goods into the estimation of 
welfare changes caused by strict standards. Rau and van Tongeren (2010) considered the 
heterogeneity of firms, and weighed the variable and fixed compliance costs of standards 
differently across firms. They specifically modeled the compliance costs in an 
oligopolistic partial equilibrium model, and applied it to the EU food safety standards for 
Polish meat firms.  
Recently, many academics have adopted simulation models to calculate the TE of 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) or NTB, caused by stringent standards. The TE 
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approach is also called the price-wedge approach, which aims to measure the effects of 
standards or NTB on the domestic price of imported good by comparing the domestic 
price with the reference price. The typical price wedge method usually assumes that all 
researched countries face an exogenous world price for imports. The TE of standard is 
calculated by excluding all other factors unrelated to the standard from the domestic price, 
including the world price, tariffs, taxes, transportation costs and other factors influencing 
the import price. Compared with the gravity approach, the advantage of simulation model 
is to directly capture the price changes. In order to obtain appropriate estimates of the 
price effect, influences on the domestic price unrelated to standards or NTMs need to be 
included (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998).  
2.2.3 Combination of Ex Ante and Ex Post Method 
Some researchers have tried to combine the ex ante and ex post methods to study the 
welfare impact of standards. Studies by Yue, Beghin and Jensen (2006) and Calvin and 
Krissoff (1998) on US apple exports to Japan demonstrated how estimates of TE could be 
combined with demand and supply analysis to obtain estimates of welfare effects of 
standards. Yue, Beghin and Jensen (2006) incorporated the heterogeneity of preferences 
into the basic constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model by assuming imperfect 
substitution between domestic and imported goods. Liu and Yue (2009) further took the 
heterogeneity of products into consideration in their study to estimate the welfare effect 
of the Japanese cut flower market by exploring the quality change of goods in the model.  
Meanwhile, Disdier and Marette (2010) first explored the link between the gravity model 
and welfare frameworks for measuring the impact of nontariff measures. Their research 
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provides the theoretical foundation for estimating endogenous parameters needed for 
welfare analysis.  
Their research only focuses on the shifting of demand and supply curves caused by the 
enforcement of stricter standards. Liu and Yue (2011) considered the potential effects of 
standards on the substitution elasticities of demand and supply by applying the variable 
elasticity of substitution (VES) model to study the welfare change happening between the 
U.S. and Japan apple trades. Since there is no agreement on the best way to measure 
welfare effects of standards, as Korinek, Melatos and Rau (2008) suggest, one should 
consider the attributes of products and consumers, whether homogenous or 
heterogeneous, and the complexity of standards to determine which model to adopt in 
welfare analysis.   
None of the above combined methods provide a methodology to quantify the 
relationships among standards, trade and welfare as they do not explicitly draw out the 
theoretical connection between ex ante and ex post methods. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This dissertation combines ex ante and ex post econometrics to estimate the effects of the 
MRPL enforcement on the EU shrimp imports. First, this dissertation sets up the 
framework and derives the estimation forms of the Gravity Model (GM) and the nested 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) model. The ex ante GM model adopts the ratio 
of domestic and bilateral trade barriers to avoid including time-varying country/industry 
fixed effects in the estimation. The ex post CES model is a partial equilibrium model, 
concerned with the effects of MRPL on consumer and suppler behavior. Second, this 
dissertation explores the links between the GM and CES frameworks for measuring the 
impact of the MRPL standard. The trade effects of MRPL are captured by the GM, while 
the welfare effects are estimated by combining the GM and nested CES approaches.  
3.1 The Gravity Model 
As stated before, the EU adopted the zero-tolerance of chloramphenicol of imported 
shrimp products in 2002 and stipulated that the rejected shipments must be destroyed, 
rather than returned to the country of origin. This policy ignored the impact on importers 
and exporters in terms of disruption in trade and loss of income. In this case, the imports 
to the EU severely deducted during the short time period between 2002 and 2005. 
However, in the long time run, the MRPL effect is hard to predict because the EU also 
imports shrimps from developed countries, which in general enforce stricter food safety 
standards than developing countries. And developing countries also improve their 
products to comply with the strict requirement of MRPL in the EU. The hypothesis tested 
here are: 
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Hypothesis 1: MRPL has a significant and negative impact on the trade integration of the 
EU shrimp market in general, regardless of the economic status of exporting countries. 
Hypothesis 2: MRPL has differential impacts on the EU shrimp trade integration based 
on the exporting countries’ level of economic development.  
This dissertation adopts the transformed way of gravity model to test the above two 
hypotheses. Trade integration is the transformed variable that captures the domestic 
barriers over bilateral trade barrier. The concept of the trade integration will be discussed 
in detail later. The advantage of transformed way over typical gravity equation lies in that 
it avoids the biased estimation caused by the perfect correlation between standard 
variables and country and time fixed effects. This section demonstrates the detailed 
derivation of the transformed gravity equation in following process. First the typical 
gravity equation is derived based on its economic foundations with CES utility function. 
Then the transformed model used for estimating MRPL effects on trade is derived by 
transforming the dependent variables in a typical gravity equation. 
3.1.1 Economic Foundations of GM 
The aggregated trade effects of stricter food safety standards can be estimated by using a 
gravity equation, which is analogous to Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Larger 
places attract people, ideas, and commodities more than smaller places. And places closer 
together have a greater attraction. This equation provides a measure of expected bilateral 
trade given the size of both partners and the bilateral transaction costs. In economics, 
gravity models have achieved empirical success in explaining inter-regional and 
international flows (Cheng and Wall, 2005).  
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During the last two decades, a remarkable number of studies have derived the GM of 
trade from very different theories of international trade. Anderson (1979) derived the 
gravity model by applying CES import demand preferences and assuming that goods 
differ by origins. Subsequent extensions of the model preserved CES preferences and 
added other assumptions. With CES preferences, Bergstrand (1989) applied a 
monopolistic competition model and derived a similar basic GM. Deardorff (1998) 
adopted a Hecksher-Ohlin structure and also obtained a similar GM.  
The basic GM follows similar patterns of including measures of the economic sizes of 
trading partners and measures of trading costs. However, based on the different theories 
in deriving the GM, the specifications of independent variables are not identical in 
empirical applications. The theoretical foundation of the GM helps to explain the 
economic meaning of variables and specification of data chosen for empirical estimation. 
The theoretical foundation in the approach used in this dissertation is the standard trade 
monopolistic competition model, derived by Anderson and Wincoop (2003), which 
employs CES demand functions.  
Following Anderson and Wincoop (2003), two assumptions are needed to derive the basic 
gravity model. The first one is that all goods are differentiated by place of origin. The 
second one is homothetic preference of consumers, approximated by a CES utility 
function. Consider the case of a one good industry. Consumers in country j consume the 
quantity cij of goods from the country. Consumers in country j maximize their utility:  
U = (∑ βicj
σ−1
σ
i )
σ
σ−1                                                        (3-1) 
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Subject to the budget constraint: 
∑ pij ciji = yj                                                           (3-2) 
Here σ measures the elasticity of substitution, which is greater than 1. β is a positive 
parameter. yj is the nominal income of country j consumers, and pij is the price in country 
j. The derivation of Gravity Model is shown in Appendix I.  
By imposing market clearing condition and solving the general equilibrium equation, 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) derived the following equation of gravity model based on 
the above derivations: 
xij =
yi yj
yW
( tij
Πi Λj
)1−σ                                               (3-3a) 
Where                            Π𝑖𝑖 = [∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 Λ𝑗𝑗⁄ )1−𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗 ]1/(1−𝜎𝜎)                                            (3-3b) 
And                                  Λj = [∑ βiσ(pitij )1−σi ]1/(1−σ)                                              (3-3c) 
Trade flow xij depends on the income of suppler yi and demander yj and is negatively 
related to the total world income yW. Пi and Λj, respectively represent the outward and 
inward multilateral resistance term. The outward multilateral resistance Пi essentially 
represents the fact that exports from country i to country j depend on the trade costs 
across all possible export markets. The inward multilateral resistance Λ𝑗𝑗  captures the 
dependence of imports into country i from country j on the trade costs across all possible 
suppliers. In particular, it is apparent that the multilateral resistance term involves trade 
costs across all bilateral routes. Thus, this model picks up the fact that changes in trade 
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cost on one bilateral route can affect trade flows on all other routes because of relative 
price effects. 
In addition, equation (3-3) indicates that large bilateral trade costs tij reduce bilateral trade 
flows, whereas large outward multilateral resistance of country i (Пi) and large inward 
multilateral resistance of country j (Λ𝑗𝑗 ) increase bilateral trade flows. 
3.1.2 The Mainstream of the GM Estimation 
The typical GM is estimated using the logarithm form of equation (3-3). The expression 
with y variables are proxies of the economic mass of country i and j, which are 
represented by GDPs in the empirical research. Based on Anderson and Wincoop’s 
derivation (see the budget constraint), one more assumption is imposed in the estimation 
model. In a single sector economy like equation (3-3), where there is no input-output 
relationship, the sum of all production must be equal to GDP. Bilateral trading costs tij 
indicate trade frictions or barriers between trading partners, for example transaction costs. 
Distance, dummy variables indicating the relationships between countries and policy 
variables are commonly used to proxy tij.  
It is clear with equation (3-3) that inward and outward multilateral resistance (Λ𝑗𝑗 and Пi) 
effectively deflate the value of variables in the basic model. However, these two terms are 
unobservable price indices. These unobserved price indices are “unobserved 
heterogeneity” between countries (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).  The unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries causes the endogeneity problem during estimation. The 
mainstream technique to consistently estimate the gravity model is to augment the gravity 
equation with fixed effects by using panel data (Frankel, Stein and Wei 1995; Anders and 
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Caswell 2009). Adding fixed effects can be as simple as adding time invariant dummy 
variables as well as importer and exporter country dummies. The unobservable 
multilateral resistance is accounted for by dummy variables. Considering the time span, 
the estimation of typical gravity equation (3-3) with country fixed effects can be written 
as equation (3-4): 
lnxijt = β1lnyit + β2lnyjt + β3lntijt + α0 + αi + αj + αt                     (3-4) 
This method has one important drawback: researchers must drop any variables that are 
collinear with the fixed effects. This restriction means that it is not possible to estimate a 
fixed effects model that also includes data that only vary by exporter (constant across all 
importers), by importer (constant across all exporters), or by time (constant across the 
time). This disadvantage limits the estimation of policy effects because many policies 
enforced in one country are applied to all trading partners. Another way to deal with this 
endogeneity problem is to transform the variables -- that is to eliminate the fixed effects 
by transforming the dependent variables. Because the EU enforced a unified standard of 
MRPL within THE EU countries, this dissertation transform variables to estimate 
unbiased policy effects of MRPL. 
3.1.3 The Transformation Method 
The transformed method is to eliminate the “unobserved heterogeneity” problem caused 
by multilateral resistance through transforming the dependent variables. Several 
researches adopted the “phi-ness” to indirectly estimate the policy-related trade costs 
(Head and Mayer 2004; Chen and Novy 2011, 2012). The typical gravity model only 
concentrates on bilateral trade flows, while the “phi-ness” considers the ratio of intra-
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country and bilateral trade flows. This indirect approach avoids the drawback of fixed 
effects gravity analysis and has the obvious advantage of extending the analysis to more 
countries and years, and more finely disaggregated data (Chen and Novy 2011). This 
research takes the advantage of “phi-ness” and improves this approach by incorporating 
the method of treating zero observations that appear in the dependent variable. 
The microeconomics foundations of the Gravity equation (3-3) indicate that larger 
bilateral trading costs tij reduce bilateral trading flows xij; whereas larger average outward 
trading barriers Пi, and larger average inward resistance Pj, increase trade flows. 
Intuitively, if a country’s trade barriers with the rest of the world are high (i.e., if the 
country’s multilateral resistance is high), the country will trade mostly domestically 
(Chen and Novy, 2011).The domestic trade flows in formal Gravity equation can be 
transformed as (3-5): 
xii =
yi yi
yW
( tii
Πi Λi
)1−σ                                              (3-5) 
Equation (3-3) and (3-5) provide a solution for the multilateral resistance. Equation (3-
17) contains outward multilateral resistance of country i (Пi) and inward multilateral 
resistance of country j (Λj). It is useful to consider the corresponding gravity equation for 
trade flows in the opposite direction. 
xji =
yj yi
yW
( tji
ΠjΛi
)1−σ                                               (3-6) 
xjj =
yj yj
yW
( tjj
Πj Λj
)1−σ                                              (3-7) 
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 After multiplying equation (3-3) by (3-6), one can get 
xij xji =
yi yj yj yi
yW yW
� 1
Πj Λi Πi Λj
�
1−σ
(tij tji )1−σ = xii xjj⁡(
tij tji
tii tjj
)1−σ                (3-8) 
This yield 
Φij ≡
xij xji
xii xjj
= (tii tjj
tji tij
)(σ−1)                                       (3-9) 
Φij is called the “phi-ness” index in previous empirical research which is interpreted as a 
microeconomic founded measure of “bilateral industry-specific trade integrations” by 
Chen and Novy (2011). The more two countries trade with each other (i.e., the higher 
xijxji), the higher is the measure of relative trade integrations. Conversely, if the two 
countries trade more domestically (i.e., the higher xiixjj), the lower is the relative trade 
integrations. If hold xji and xii being equal, higher trade integration means that there are 
higher imports from i to j than domestic trade within country j.  
In addition, the Φij combines the ratio of bilateral to domestic trade with the industry-
specific elasticity of substitution σ. If σ is high, consumers are very sensitive to trade cost 
changes and a small increase in bilateral trade cost would lead to high reduction to the 
ratio of bilateral over domestic trade. 
Equation (3-9) infers that the “phi-ness” index is only related with trade costs indicators. 
The tij and tji represent the bilateral trading costs between i and j while tii and tjj measure 
domestic trading costs of i and j. The “phi-ness” index can be viewed as an indicator of 
trade integration that measures the domestic trade barriers relative to bilateral trade 
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barriers. Trade integration and bilateral trade flows are expected to increase with lower 
bilateral trade costs and decrease with lower domestic trade costs. 
The trade cost symmetry is not imposed in this research, so tij and tji may not be equal. 
Because this paper is dedicated to explain the effects of policies, which are dramatically 
different among countries, different policies may lead to differentiate trade costs. 
However, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, footnote 11) point out, there are many 
combinations of tij and tji that can lead to the same trade flows (xij and xji). Given this 
theoretical foundation, it is hard to identify the asymmetry of tij and tji from the trade 
data. This research adopts the same method of using the average trade costs as Chen and 
Novy (2011) did in their study. The average trade costs are treated as the geometric mean 
of trade cost factors, i.e. (tijtji)1/2.   
Then equation (3-9) can be written as: 
Φij =
xij xij
xii xjj
= ( tii tjj
�(tji tij )
1
2�
2)(σ−1)                               (3-10) 
After transforming and taking logarithm, the equation (3-10) is  
lnΦij = ln
xij xji
xii xjj
= (1 − σ) ∙ ln( tii tjj
�(tji tij )
1
2�
2) = (1 − σ) ∙ 2 ∙ ln(tij tji )
1
2 + (σ − 1) ∙ lntii +
(σ − 1) ∙ lntjj                                                              (3-11) 
Neither the averaged bilateral trade cost (tijtji)1/2 nor the domestic trade cost tii and tjj in 
equation (3-11) can be directly estimated. As other academics do, I also use proxy 
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variables to reflect the effects of trade cost, including basic gravity variables, policy 
variable and financial variables (Shepherd, 2013). In the basic GM, the variables 
influencing bilateral trade cost include distance between export and import economic 
centers (DISTij), and dummy variables that indicate whether countries share a common 
land board (BORDij), share a common official language (LANGij), and were once 
colonized by the same power (COLYij). These variables are used as a part of variable to 
control the bilateral trade cost. Moreover, I adopt the domestic distance to proxy the 
domestic trade costs, i.e. 
lntii = μi lnDii + ξi                                            (3-12a) 
And                    lntjj = μj lnDjj +ξj                                            (3-12b) 
the parameter µi and µj respectively present the elasticity of domestic trade cost tii and tjj 
to the changes of domestic distance Dii and Djj. And ξ measures the error term of 
estimation. 
The effects of MRPL on trade flows in this research can be measured by adding the 
variable MRPLt to represent the level of MRPL, which is the policy variable of bilateral 
trade costs. This research defines MRPL in part per billion (ppb) for Chloramphenicol. As 
discussed in the section 1.2.3, the MRPL level of Chloramphenicol was not specified 
when the MRPL regulation was originally published in 2002 and THE EU adopted the 
“zero-tolerance” policy on detecting the residues of Chloramphenicol. In 2005, THE EU 
shifted from “zero-tolerance” policy to 0.3 ppb level of MRPL for Chloramphenicol. In 
this research, MRPL values at 0 between 2002 and 2004, and changes to 0.3 ppb 
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thereafter. European Commission enforced a unified MRPL requirement for all shrimp 
products imported by member countries, thus the value of MRPL is the same for all 
importers j and exporters i and varies with time t.  
This study adds two more adjustment factors to the gravity model: the exchange rate and 
tariff, which are also parts of bilateral trade costs. Based on Bergstrand’s derivation (1985 
and 1989), three important price indices cannot be neglected in the derivation of the 
gravity equation: transportation costs, tariffs and the exchange rates. Moreover, Soloaga 
and Winters (2001) and Zarzoz and Lehmann (2002) point out that exchange rate 
movements become relevant when the time dimension is considered in the analysis. The 
real exchange rate, EXCHijt, is added to the model specification since a time dimension is 
incorporated in the analysis. Transportation costs are controlled by distance (DISTij) and 
tariff is controlled by tariff measure (TARijt). Because the intra trade between the EU 
countries is also included in analysis, a dummy variable EUit is added to identify whether 
the exporter is the EU member. The proxy of averaged bilateral trade cost can be written 
as: 
ln(tij tji )
1
2 = μ1BORDij + μ2LANGij + μ3COLYij + μ4lnDISTij + μ5lnEXCHijt + μ6MRPLt
+ μ7EUit + μ8TARijt  
                                                               (3-13) 
The parameters of µ measure the elasticity of each factor that affects bilateral trade cost. 
After substituting (3-12) and (3-13) into (3-11), the basic gravity equation can be written 
as equation (3-14). 
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lnΦijt = ln(
xij xij
xii xjj
)t = α ∙ ln(tij tji )t
1/2 + λ ∙ (lntii + lntjj )t
= α0 + α1BORDij + α2LANGij + α3COLYij + α4lnDISTij + α5lnEXCHijt
+ α6MRPLt + α7TARijt + α8EUit + λi lnDii
1
2 + λj lnDjj
1
2 + εijt  
             (3-14) 
xjj and xii are respectively the dollar value of domestic demand of shrimp in the EU and 
country i at time t. xij and xji are bilateral trade value at time t. The disturbance term, εjt, is 
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance for all time 
periods. The description of variables and expected signs of explanatory variables are 
listed in Table 3-1. 
Dealing with zero trade observations is a common issue in gravity models. Westerlund 
and Wilhelm (2009) point out that OLS estimates of the log-linear model may be both 
biased and inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity when zero value observations 
are omitted. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009) point out that the PPML estimator is 
generally well behaved even when the dependent variable has a large proportion of zeros. 
EU is one of the biggest importers of shrimp in the world while not a leading exporter. 
The data of bilateral trade flow contain large amounts of zero observations. 
This research introduces PPML method into the log form of “phi-ness” to deal with this 
problem. PPML with “phi-ness” GM is specified as 
Φijt = exp⁡(α0 + α1BORDij + α2LANGij + α3COLYij + α4lnDISTij + α5lnEXCHijt +
α6MRPLt + α7TARijt + α8EUit + λi lnDii
1
2 + λj lnDjj
1
2 + εijt )                 (3-15) 
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Table 3-1. Variable Descriptions and Expected Signs  
Variables Variable Description Expected Sign 
Φijt Trade integration measuring the ratio of bilateral trade over 
domestic trade at time t 
 
DISTij Geographical distance between country i and THE EU 
members j. in miles 
- 
Dii Geographical distance of country i. in milies + 
Djj Geographical distance of the EU member j. in milies + 
lnEXCHijt Exchange rate between the EU and domestic currency of 
country j. It is an index with the first year being 100 
- 
MRPLt Variable to identify MRPL enforcement in EU., which equals to 
0 before 2002, 0.3 between 2002 and 2004, and 1 thereafter 
To be 
determined 
LANGij Dummy variables to identify common official language, which 
equals 1 if country i shares the common official language with 
EU member j, and 0 otherwise 
+ 
COLYij Dummy variables to indicate colony by the same power, which 
equals 1 if country I was once colonized by the same power 
with EU member j, and 0 otherwise 
+ 
BORDij Dummy variables to indicate common land board, which equals 
1 if country i shares the common land board with EU member j, 
and 0 otherwise 
+ 
EUit Dummy variable to identify EU members, which equals 1 if 
exporter i is EU members 
+ 
TARijt Weighted average tariff of imported shrimp products between 
EU member j and exporter i, in % 
- 
 
Equation (3-15) is the benchmark model for this study and it is used to test the 
hypotheses by running separate panel regressions for the three groups of countries: all 
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exporting countries, developed countries and developing countries. The regression of all 
countries is used to test whether MRPL presents significant and negative effect on the 
trade integration of the EU shrimp market. The comparison between regressions of 
developed country group and developing country group is applied to determine whether 
MRPL requirements have differential effects on EU trade integrations with these two 
countries groups. The OLS results are included for comparison purposes in order to show 
the advantage of PPML when there are a large amount of zero-valued observations. 
3.2 Framework of Nested CES Model 
Welfare changes of consumers and suppliers are analyzed based on a demand and supply 
system. Current research that combines the GM and welfare analysis usually specifies 
demand and supply functions without considering the economic foundation of the linkage 
between the two with the GM. This treatment infers that the GM can be combined with 
demand and supply systems in any formulation. However, the derivation of the GM 
shows that consumer demand functions must be in a particular form. Thus welfare 
analysis conceptually is problematic because the combination of the GM and demand 
functions in other forms lacks theoretical support. The analytical framework in this 
research follows a different approach. The modeling system starts by deriving a gravity 
equation-CES model, incorporates possible changes in consumer behavior caused by 
MRPL, derives demand and supply functions, and analyzes welfare changes using these 
consistent functional forms. 
The CES model is the base for analyzing welfare change in this research. This approach 
is often used for calculating tariff equivalents in existing research. For example, Yue, 
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Beghin, and Jensen (2006) improve the basic CES model by explicitly incorporating 
commodity heterogeneity into consumer preferences and Liu and Yue (2009) introduce 
the possible product quality changes into a CES model for welfare analysis. This study is 
different from existing studies in two ways. First, this dissertation incorporates the 
heterogeneity of goods into consumer preferences by considering the substitution 
between domestic and imported shrimp in the EU. Second, this study considers the power 
of the EU as a “large country” in the world shrimp market. As one of the top four shrimp 
importers in the world, the EU has the power to directly change its domestic price 
through new policies and indirectly change the import price by controlling import 
quantities. 
3.2.1 Consumers Model 
This research accounts for the changes in customer confidence in shrimp products 
provided by internal and external suppliers through a CES analytical framework. Since 
the EU is a very heterogeneous market and empirical research suggests differing effects 
of standards based on economic status, the heterogeneity of imported products from 
different regions is considered through the inclusion of prices by regions. In order to 
determine the differential impacts of food safety standards on heterogeneous products, 
this study adopts a nested utility function in a manner similar to Liu and Yue (2011). The 
representative consumer maximizes utility at two levels. At the first level, the 
representative consumer optimizes utility by choosing between domestic and imported 
goods. At the second level, the consumer decides on where the imported goods originate; 
from developed countries or developing countries.  
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The CES model used in welfare analysis has the same assumptions as the one used in 
deriving the GM. Consumers in EU countries must have homothetic preferences, and 
domestic and imported products are not perfect substitutes. At the first level of the nested 
model, the representative consumer maximizes the following CES utility function subject 
to a budget constraint, where the domestic and imported products are defined as D and I 
respectively: 
MAXD,IU1(D, I) = [βDD
ρ1 + (1 − βD)I
ρ1 ]
1 ρ1�                   (3-16a) 
s. t     PDD + PFI = M                                                (3-16b) 
βD = φD + ηD ∙ MRPL                                           (3-16c) 
ρ1 = 1 −
1
σ1
                                                        (3-16d) 
σ1 measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. βD and 
1- βD indicate consumer confidence in domestic and imported foods with regard to food 
safety or quality. This dissertation assumes that βD is a linear function of MRPL. ηD 
measures the change in consumer confidence from implementing food safety standards. If 
the coefficient ηD is significantly different from zero, then it is necessary to account for 
changes in consumer confidence in domestic and imported goods caused by MRPL 
standards. M is total expenditures on shrimp products. The variable MRPL is defined in 
the same way as in the GM. The EU enforced a zero tolerance policy for chloramphenicol 
in 2002, and shifted away from zero tolerance to set the MRPL limitation at 0.3ppb in 
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2005. Thus MRPL values at 0 between 2002 and 2004, and changes to 0.3 in 2005 and 
thereafter. 
At the second level of utility maximization, the representative consumer confronts the 
choice between shrimp products imported from developed countries (IE) and developing 
countries (II). 
MAXIE ,II U
2(IE, II) = [βIIE
ρ2 + (1 − βI)II
ρ2 ]
1 ρ2�                       (3-17a) 
s. t     PEIE + PIII = MI                                          (3-17b) 
βI = φI + ηI ∙ MRPL                                            (3-17c) 
ρ2 = 1 −
1
σ2
                                                   (3-17d) 
σ2 measures the elasticity of substitution between goods imported from developed and 
developing countries. This research allows the elasticities of substitution in the first and 
second level optimization to differ; that is σ1 may not be equal to σ2. βI and 1- βI indicate 
consumer confidence in imported food with regard to food safety or quality. βI is also 
assumed to be a linear function of MRPL. ηI measures the change in consumer 
confidence due to the implementation of food safety standards. If the coefficient ηI is 
significantly different from zero, it is necessary to account for changes in consumer 
confidence at the second level of optimization caused by the MRPL standard. MI is 
expenditure on imported shrimp products.  
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The nested CES framework combined the first and second level maximization of utilities 
is: 
MAXD,IE ,II   U(D, IE, II) = [βDD
ρ1 + (1 − βD){[βIIE
ρ2 + (1 − βI)II
ρ2 ]
1 ρ2� }ρ1 ]
1 ρ1�    (3-18a) 
s.t  PEIE + PIII + PDD = M                                  (3-18b) 
PIII + PEIE = MI                                             (3-18c) 
From utility maximization, the conditions that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to 
the relative price of the substitute goods can be written as: 
MRSD,   IE =
MUD
MUIE
=
PD
PE
=
βDD
ρ1−1
�1 − βD� ∙ IE
ρ2−1 ∙ βI ∙ �βIIE
ρ2 + �1 − βI�II
ρ2�
�
ρ1
ρ2
−1�
 
= βD IE
1/σ2
�1−βD �D
1/σ1
∙ βI
−1 ∙ �βIIE
(1− 1σ2
)
+ �1 − βI�II
(1− 1σ2
)
�
σ2−σ1
σ1(1−σ2)
              (3-19a) 
MRSIE ,   II =
MU IE
MU II
= PE
PI
= βI
�1−βI�
∙ � II
IE
�
1−ρ2 = βI
�1−βI�
∙ � II
IE
�
1
σ2                    (3-19b)   
 After rearranging equation (3-19a) and (3-19b) and taking the natural logarithms, the 
equations used for estimating parameters are: 
ln �
MI
PI ∙ II
− 1� = σ2 ∙ ln
βI
1 − βI
+ (σ2 − 1) ∙ ln �
PI
PE
� 
= (σ2 − 1) ∙ ln �
PI
PE
� + σ2 ∙ ln�
φI + ηI ∙ MRPL
1 − φI − ηI ∙ MRPL
� 
                                                          (3-20a) 
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ln PD ∙D
PE ∙IE
= (σ1 − 1) ln �
PE
PD
� + σ1 ∙ ln �
φD +ηD ∙MRPL
1−φD−ηD ∙MRPL
� −
(σ1−1)σ2
(σ2−1)
ln�φI + ηI ∙ MRPL� +
σ2−σ1
σ2−1
ln⁡[1 + ( 1
φI+ηI ∙MRPL
− 1)σ2 ∙ �PE
PI
�
σ2−1
]  
                                        (3-20b) 
Annual data on the exogenous variables D, IE, II, PI, PE, PD, and MI can be retrieved from 
databases and the parameters σ1, σ2,φI, φE, ηI, and ηE can be estimated using non-linear 
three stage least square (N3SLS).  
The associated Marshallian Demand functions are  
D(PD, PE, PI, MI) = MI �
βD
1−βD
�
σ1
( 1
PD
)σ1 [βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + (1 − βI)
σ2 PI1−σ2 ]
1−σ1
σ2−1    (3-21a) 
IE(PE, PI, MI) = MI �
βI
PE
�
σ2
[βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + (1 − βI)
σ2 PI1−σ2 ]−1                  (3-21b)   
II(PE, PI, MI) = MI �
1−βI
PI
�
σ2
[βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + (1 − βI)
σ2 PI1−σ2 ]−1                  (3-21c)   
The indirect utility functions of the first and second level maximization are V1 and V2. 
V1(PD, PE, PI, MI) = M{βD
σ1 PD1−σ1 + �1 − βD�
σ1�βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + �1 − βI�
σ2 PI1−σ2�
σ1−1
σ2−1}
1
σ1−1 
                   (3-22a) 
V2(PE, PI, MI) = MI[βI
σ2 PI1−σ2 + �1 − βI�
σ2 PE1−σ2 ]
1
σ2−1               (3-22b) 
The expenditure functions of the first level and second level optimization are  
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E1(PE, PI, u1) = u1�βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + �1 − βI�
σ2 PI1−σ2�
1
1−σ2                 (3-23a) 
E2(PD, PE, PI, u2) = u2{βD
σ1 PD1−σ1 + �1 − βD�
σ1�βI
σ2 PE1−σ2 + �1 − βI�
σ2 PI1−σ2�
σ1−1
σ2−1}
1
σ1−1 
                 (3-23b) 
3.2.2 Supply Model 
An equilibrium displacement model is used for the model’s supply side. Let SD, 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
be the domestic supply, foreign supply of shrimp from developed countries, and foreign 
supply of shrimp from developing countries, respectively. The supply is an increasing 
function with price P and parameter γ. The supplier functions follow the relations shown 
in (3-24): 
SD�PD, γD� = γD PD                                      (3-24a) 
SIE �PE, γE� = γEPE                                       (3-24b) 
SII�PI, γI� = γIPI                                        (3-24c) 
where subscript D, E, and I respectively indicate domestic supply, foreign supply from 
developed countries, and foreign supply from developing countries. All of the γs are 
positive. Decrease in parameter γ would reflect the upward shift of supply function if the 
MRPL requirement increases the compliance cost for suppliers and induce the increase of 
production costs. The original γ parameters can be estimated with data of domestic and 
foreign supply quantity and price. The (3-24) system is estimated simultaneously by 
using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) in SAS.  
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It is assumed that domestic suppliers already incorporate the MRPL standard and the 
domestic supply curve is not affected by lowering MRPL. This was the case with the new 
2002 policy that impacted mainly Asian exporters, since chloramphenicol was already 
banned in EU since 1994 (Disdier and Marette, 2010). Thus γD will not change with 
MRPL level. If EU shifts MRPL policy to zero, foreign suppliers, no matter in developed 
countries or developing countries, may incur more compliance cost and the foreign 
supply curve may rotate upward. Thus the parameter γI and γE may reduce after the 
reduction of MRPL. The changes of γI and γE could be captured by the estimation of 
MRPL in the “phi-ness” GM, which will be discussed in detail later.  
3.2.3 Calculation of Welfare Change 
As stated in section 1.3, in order to explore the effect of strict standard, this research 
measures the welfare based on two scenarios with different levels of MRPL and then 
compare the difference between welfares under these two scenarios. The initial scenario 
reflects the current set of MRPL for chloramphenicol, which values at zero from 2002 to 
2004 and at 0.3 ppb since 2005. The new scenario considers the effects of sticking MRPL 
at zero in 2005 and thereafter. MRPL regulation is stricter in the new scenario. 
The first step of calculating welfare changes is to determine the price and quantities at the 
new equilibrium. Equation (21) and (24) provides the parameters and the demand and 
supply functions at the initial scenario. The products supplied by domestic suppliers and 
foreign supplier from developed countries and developing countries are heterogeneous as 
the prices differ among PD, PE and PI. At the new equilibrium, the domestic and foreign 
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shrimp products are identical and share the same price P. The new price is determined by 
the total demand and total supply of domestic and foreign products. 
At the new equilibrium, there is PD= PE =PI= P and the total demand of shrimp products 
in the EU can be written as: 
TD = D1 + IE1 + II1
= MI �
βD
1
1 − βD
1�
σ1
(
1
P
)σ1 [(βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 + (1 − βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 ]
1−σ1
σ2−1
+ MI �
βI
1
P
�
σ2
[(βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 + (1 − βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 ]−1
+ MI �
1 − βI
1
P
�
σ2
[(βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 + (1 − βI
1)σ2 P1−σ2 ]−1
= MI �
βD
1
1 − βD
1�
σ1 [(βI
1)σ2 + (1 − βI
1)σ2 ]
1−σ1
σ2−1
P
+
MI
P
 
(3-25) 
The total supply function can be written as: 
TS = SD1 + SIE
1 + SII
1 = γD P + γE
1P + γI
1P                    (3-26) 
The superscript 1 reflects the new equilibrium when MRPL sticks at level zero from 
2002. γD is assumed to be the same in the initial and new scenario. The changes of γE and 
γI can be captured by the estimation of MRPL effects on trade integrations in “phi-ness” 
GM with PPML. The direct relationship between γI, γE and the parameters of estimating 
MRPL effects on trade integrations will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
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The market clear condition at equilibrium can be written as: 
TS = TD                                                        (3-27) 
The equation of (3-25), (3-26) and (3-27) constitute the calibrated model system to 
determine the universal price and the supply quantities at the new equilibrium. 
This dissertation considers the changes to consumers’ surplus caused by the reduction of 
MRPL. For consumer welfare analysis, the Equivalent Variation (EV) measure is used.  
EV = V1�P�1, MI� − V0                                            (3-28) 
where 𝑃𝑃� = (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 ,𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 ,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼) and superscript 1 and 0 indicate new and initial prices in equation 
(3-28) and thereafter. The change of consumers’ surplus is defined as the changes of 
consumers’ utility. The new price P and quantity D1 IE1 II1 are determined by the domestic 
market equilibrium, which considers the effects of lowering the MRPL at zero tolerance 
policy on imports and domestic market. 
The calculation of the supplier’s welfare change (ΔSW) is shown with equation (3-29). If 
γ does not change with MRPL, the welfare changes of suppliers are calculated as (3-29a), 
otherwise the welfare changes are calculated as (3-29b). 
∆SW = ∫ S ∙ PP1P0 dP                                                    (3-29a) 
∆SW = ∫ S1 ∙ P
P1
0 dP − ∫ S0 ∙ P
P0
0 dP                         (3-29b) 
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The total EU welfare change caused by reduction of MRPL is the sum of consumer’s 
utility change and domestic suppliers’ welfare changes. The welfare changes for foreign 
suppliers can also be obtained with equations of (3-29). 
3.3 Combination of GM and Nested CES 
The “phi-ness” GM and nested CES model adopted in this research play different roles in 
estimating the effects of MRPL enforcement on the EU shrimp market. The former model 
is used to estimate the effects on the trade flows while the latter is used to quantify 
welfare changes caused by MRPL. In this application, these two models are developed 
based on the same foundation. The basic GM equation is derived with a CES utility 
function and competitive assumptions. The “phi-ness” method for estimating the GM is 
setup by transforming the bilateral trade flows of the basic GM into intra-country and 
extra-country trade flows. The nested CES model begins with the basic CES model and 
introduces two levels of utility maximization into a representative consumer’s utility 
function. The demand and supply functions are then developed based on a nested CES 
function.  
Because the two models are derived with the same foundations there are inherent links 
between the “phi-ness” GM and the nested CES model. These two models can be viewed 
as two different branches originating from the same basic theory. In general, the links can 
be inferred from the variable concepts, the elasticity of substitution and the measurement 
of standard effects. 
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3.3.1 Links of Variables Concepts 
The links of variables concepts lie in the relationship between trade flow variables used 
in the “phi-ness” GM and nested CES model. As stated earlier, the “phi-ness” GM 
considers bilateral trade flows between EU importers j and exporters i (xij and xji) and 
trade flows intra j (xjj) and intra i (xii). The nested CES model considers domestic supply 
of EU members D, total foreign supplies from developed countries IE, and total foreign 
supplies from developing countries II.  
In equation (3-3) of the basic GM, xij represents the domestic supply of EU members 
when i=j; while when i≠j, x ij is the value of shrimp products exported to EU from either 
developed countries or developing countries depending on importing origins. In equation 
(3-16), (3-17) and (3-18), the domestic supply D equals xjj in the GM. At the first level of 
optimizing consumer utility, IE and II are the aggregated value of shrimp imported from 
developed and developing countries. In other words, IE and II in equation (3-17) and (3-
18) are the summed values of xij that weigh the bilateral trade flow by the consumers’ 
preferences across different exporters in each country groups of respectively developed 
countries and developing countries. In this case, the nested CES model, equation (3-18) 
can be viewed as the weighted aggregate form of the basic CES model, equation (3-1).  
In general, both the “phi-ness” GM and nested CES model adopt the domestic supply 
variable for the EU, and foreign supply from developed countries and developing 
countries. However, these two models use these variables at different levels of 
aggregation. The “phi-ness” GM adopts the disaggregation of trade flows while the 
nested CES uses an aggregated trade flow. This difference originates from their differing 
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purposes. The “phi-ness” GM concerns international trade, which emphasizes 
differentiation between trading partners. Disaggregated data provides more detailed 
information about the variable effects among exporters and importers. The nested CES 
concentrates on the welfare changes for EU countries and emphasizes the changes to 
suppliers and consumers in aggregation, so aggregated data are more suitable for CES 
model. 
3.3.2 Links of Elasticities of Substitution 
As stated above, “phi-ness” GM and nested CES model originate from the same basic 
model. In addition to the same variables used in estimation, these two models share the 
same value of substitution elasticities: σ or ρ in nested CES model. The value of σ plays 
an important role in estimating the “true” elasticity of trade cost variables with respect to 
trade cost. Based on the derivation of equation (3-11), (3-12) and (3-13), the estimated 
coefficient of equation (3-14) are the product of the elasticities of substitution (1-σ) and 
the “true” elasticities μ with respect to variables that proxy trade cost, i. e. α=2(1-σ)·μ 
and λ=(σ-1)·μ.  If the σ is high and the “true” elasticity μ is low, one small change in 
variable would not change the trade cost so much but dramatically change the trade 
integration.  
Only once the elasticities of substitution σ are observed can the elasticities of proxy 
variables with respect to trade costs be retrieved as μ =α/2(1-σ) and μ =λ/(σ-1). As the 
research groups or industries differ, the value of elasticities of substitution could also be 
different (Chen and Novy’s 2011; Liu and Yue 2011). σ can be estimated by nested CES 
model, as shown in estimating equation (3-20a) and (3-20b).  
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Estimation results for equations of (3-20) provide two values of elasticities of 
substitution: σ1 and σ2. At the first level of maximization of CES model, σ1 measures the 
substitution between domestic supply and overall foreign supply and can be combined 
with the “phi-ness” GM that quantifies the standard effects on overall imports. When the 
regression covers all exporting countries, σ1 is applied to equation (3-15). σ2 measures the 
substitution between imports from developing countries and developed countries. This 
elasticity of substitution in allows the standard effects to vary by economic status of 
exporters. Thus σ2 is applied to equation (3-15) of the GM when the regression is running 
with the data of developed country group and developing country group. In order to keep 
the estimation and analysis consistent, the same country groups of developed countries 
and developing countries are used in the “phi-ness” GM and nested CES models.  
3.3.3 Links of Measuring Standard Effects 
The link in measuring MRPL effects between the GM and nested CES models is reflected 
by the essence of trade flows and welfare changes. MRPL affects disaggregated trade 
flows by changing trading costs and affects aggregate welfare by changing consumer and 
supplier behavior. Trade flows are comprised of import price and quantities, which are PI, 
PE, II and IE in nested CES model. The changes of MRPL level influences consumer and 
supplier behavior and further alters demand and domestic and foreign supply. Market 
equilibrium is affected because of the supply and demand shifts, so welfare and 
international trade flow change too. 
The reduction of MRPL could affect foreign supply by changing the value of γI or γE and 
these changes can be captured by the estimation of MRPL effects on trade integrations of 
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developing countries and developed countries in the GM model. For the purpose of easy 
understanding, let’s first focus on the supply curve of developing countries. If γI 
dramatically reduces and induces import-quantity shrink distinctly after the reduction of 
MRPL, the imported value of developing countries decrease at equilibrium as the 
contraction of import-quantity is larger than the increase in price (i.e. P*II1<PI0*II0). Since 
the domestic supply is not affected by MRPL, the domestic trade flow increases with 
increased new price, and then the trade integration would be significantly reduced by the 
MRPL reduction. And the welfare of foreign suppliers from developing countries 
deceases significantly. The welfare of domestic consumers may also decrease when the 
new price is too high. 
Alternatively, if γI stays unchanged, the trade integration would not be affected by MRPL 
regulation. At the initial scenario, the trade integration can be calculated as: 
Φ0 = �
xji ∗PI∗II
xji PD∗D
� = � PI∗PI∗γI
PD∗PD∗γD
∙ xji
xji
� = ( PI
2∗γI
PD
2 ∗γD
∙ xji
xji
)                         (3-30) 
At the new equilibrium it then only depends on γI and γD .                               
Φ1 = �
P∗II
P∗D
∙ xji
xji
� = �P
2∗γI
P2∗γD
∙ xji
xji
� = � γI
γD
∙ xji
xji
�                             (3-31) 
Since this research concentrates on EU countries (j in the equations) and assumes that 
domestic trade flows and imports of import country i are not changed, the changes from 
Φ0 to Φ1 depend on the difference between the initial price PI and PD. In reality this 
difference is remote. Most of empirical research normally treats PI and PD at the same 
value. In this case the change of trade integration is negligible.  
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If γI does not dramatically reduce, then the increase of PI overcomes the changes of 
quantity (P*II1≥PI0*II0). So the effects of MRPL on trade integration may not be 
significant.  In this case, the significance of MRPL effects on trade flows could indicate 
the movement of supply curve of the developing countries.  
The above analysis indicates that when MRPL demonstrates significant effects on trade 
integrations, γ of foreign supplier curve would dramatically change; while if MRPL 
demonstrates insignificant effects on trade integrations, γ may stay unchanged or change 
slightly, which could not be quantified with econometric estimation. This indication 
applies to each exporters group of developed and developing countries. 
Based on the research of Disdier and Marette (2010), if the MRPL has no significant 
impact on trade, no further welfare analysis of the MRPL will be necessary. This research 
follows the same pattern. If α6 in equation (3-15) is estimated to be statistically 
significant, it will be used for the welfare analysis linked to MRPL. 
By taking the derivative from (3-15), the relative variation of exports in value linked to 
MRPL can be defined as dx/x = α6·dMRPL (everything else being constant). The relative 
variation of exports linked to the MRPL can be rewritten as: 
d[ln �xij xji
xii xjj
�] = α6dMRPL                                         (3-32)   
Since the domestic trade flow and imports of import country i are assumed to be 
unchanged, equation (3-42) can be derived as: 
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d �ln �xij xji
xii xjj
�� = d �ln �xij
xjj
��] = α6dMRPL                               (3-33) 
As stated in section 3.1.3, separate panel regressions are run with the benchmark of the 
GM model with PPML for the three groups of countries: all exporter countries, developed 
countries, and developing countries.  The value of trade is defined by x =P·Q, where P 
and Q are the price and the quantity. For developed country group and developing 
country group, equation (3-33) can be written as equation (3-34a) and (3-34b) after 
substituting in the new and initial price and quantities at equilibrium: 
d �ln�
xijE
xjj
�� = d �ln�
PijEQijE
Pjj Qjj
�� =
P − PE0
PE0
+
IE − IE0
IE0
−
P − PD0
PD0
−
D − D0
D0
= α6E∆MRPL 
(3-34a) 
d �ln�
xijI
xjj
�� = d �ln�
PijI QijI
Pjj Qjj
�� =
P − PI0
PI0
+
II − II0
II0
−
P − PD0
PD0
−
D − D0
D0
= α6I∆MRPL 
(3-34b) 
The superscript 0 indicates the initial price and quantity while parameters of price and 
quantities without index 0 indicate the corresponding values at the new equilibrium after 
removing the changes of MRPL. As stated in former section, the new price P are 
universal between domestic and foreign products as the products are identical after 
enforcing MRPL at zero level. α6E and α6I are respectively the coefficients measuring 
MRPL effects on trade with all exporters, developed countries and developing countries. 
When the impact of the MRPL is statistically significant, the gravity analysis can be 
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integrated into the welfare analysis via equation (3-34) that isolates the effect of the 
MRPL variation from other effects. 
The estimation of α6A for group of all exporters is not considered in the welfare analysis 
that measures the differentiate changes of supplies based on exporters’ economic status. 
Since this α6 concentrates on the MRPL effects on the aggregated imported products and 
does not consider the heterogeneity among products, it could not provide the information 
of differentiate effects of MRPL based on different country group. 
Equation (3-25), (3-26), (3-27) and (3-34) constitute the calibrated model to calculate the 
new coefficient γ and the new price and supply quantities at the new equilibrium. Only if 
α6 demonstrates statistical significance, the corresponding equation of (3-34) is 
incorporated into the calibration. The calibration includes the following two scenarios 
depending on the significance of α6. 
1. If any one of α6E and α6I or both show statistical significance, the analysis of changes 
to γE or γI should be combined with the estimation of corresponding α6 of the GM.  
2. If neither α6E nor α6I demonstrates statistical significance, γE and γI are deemed to stay 
unchanged at the new equilibrium. In this case, the welfare analysis based on the 
heterogeneous products from different origins is unachievable. If α6A presents 
significance, then the welfare analysis should be based on all exporters in 
aggregation. This happens when both γE and γI changes slightly and the estimation of 
MRPL in the GM could not capture these changes, but the changes of total foreign 
supplies that add the two together are significant. Otherwise, if α6A is insignificant, 
the welfare analysis is then deemed to be unnecessary. 
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 The significance of the MRPL effect can also be indirectly reflected by parameters in the 
consumer CES utility function. If the MRPL has significant effects on trade integrations 
of all exporters, then consumers change the consumption between domestic and total 
foreign shrimp products. Thus, consumer confidence in domestic and foreign suppliers 
may be dramatically affected by MRPL and the parameter ηD may have a statistical 
significant effect. Moreover, if any α6 for the developed country or developing country 
group is statistically significant, then the trade with corresponding country group is 
significantly affected by the MRPL standard. This result infers that consumer confidence 
in shrimp products imported from developed countries and developing countries may be 
severely influenced by MRPL. Thus the parameter ηI may demonstrate statistical 
significance. 
3.4 Data Description 
3.4.1 Data Description of “phi-ness” GM 
This research uses annual data between 2002 and 2010 across 12 EU countries to 
estimate the model. The 12 EU countries included are Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom. The sample is not balanced due to limitations on trade data. The time series 
begins in 2002 because that is when the MRPL was first enforced. Since the legitimate 
information about MRPL is lacking before 2002, only countries with data that is available 
since 2001 are considered in this research. After selection, 72 exporting countries are 
used in the analysis. Developed and developing countries are categorized according to the 
list of High-income OECD members provided by the World Bank. 24 developed 
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countries and 48 developing countries are used in the analysis. The majority of developed 
countries are EU countries. Other developed countries include Australia, Canada, 
Greenland, Japan, South Korean, and the United States. In this case, the EU and non EU 
developed countries are combined together in the analysis.  
The estimation needs the domestic trade of countries i and j, xii and xjj, as well as their 
bilateral exports, xij and xji, at time t to compute the “phi-ness” index for the GM. The 
Harmonized System Code (HS) category 030613 and 030623, for the frozen and non-
frozen shrimps and prawns are the focus of this analysis. These two categories exclude all 
the more-processed shrimp and prawn products, which have been processed and put into 
air-tight containers or prepared with other fish or meat. These last products are 
categorized under the HS category 160520. All data on value, quantity and unit price used 
in analysis are separately provided for frozen and non-frozen categories. Since the data of 
all shrimp products are used for the analysis, this research uses the aggregated data by 
adding frozen and non frozen shrimp together. 
The data of domestic trade flows were not found directly in the existing database. Only 
data on the domestic supply of all crustaceans is available through FAOSTAT (2014); 
data on domestic shrimp supply is not available. As in previous literature (Chen and 
2011, Liu and Yue 2011), the domestic trade of country j (i) is calculated by the value of 
gross shrimp output minus the value of total shrimp exports of j (i) to the rest of the 
world. There are no available data on the value of shrimp output. The values of shrimp 
outputs are calculated by multiplying the quantity of total shrimp production with the 
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aggregated Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) shrimp price. Data on total production 
(measured in tonne) is obtained from the Global Production database.  
Table 3-2. Data Summary of “phi-ness” Gravity Model with All Exporters 
Country 
Group Variable Observation Mean Variance Min Max 
All 
Exporters 
xij (thousand $) 4062 8075742 20700000 5 341000000 
xji (thousand $) 1846 6715581 15400000 1 140000000 
xii (thousand $) 4062 435.95 1201.57 0 11454.08 
xjj (thousand $) 4062 35.37 36.72 0.70 150.26 
cif ($/kg) 4062 5.58 7.39 0.022 164.70 
Production (tonne) 4062 58625.90 223760.10 0 2582651.00 
Total Export (tonne) 4062 17020.90 35749.65 0 252949.00 
DomesticTrade (tonne) 4062 44790.81 204036 0 2414490 
Φij 4041 293063.40 2723519 0 79400000 
DISTij (kilometers) 4062 5655.70 4054.63 160.93 17625.29 
Dii (kilometers) 4062 399.44 377.13 8.45 1853.80 
Djj (kilometers) 4062 261.37 142.32 66.78 462.52 
MRPL 4062 0.18 0.15 0 0.30 
Tariff  2802 0.17 0.15 0 0.30 
Exchange Rate index 4062 1.40 1.00 0.62 8.51 
EU 4062 0.31 0.46 0 1.00 
zero observations 2195 
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Table 3-3. Data Summary of “phi-ness” Gravity Model with Developed Countries 
Country 
Group Variable Observation Mean Variance Min Max 
Developed  
countries 
xij (thousand $) 1702 5610238 11600000 5 108000000 
xji (thousand $) 1275 8738960 17000000 1 140000000 
xii (thousand $) 1702 107.47 230.73 0 1324.84 
xjj (thousand $) 1702 32.02 35.42 0.70 150.26 
cif ($/kg) 1702 5.91 2.44 1.15 12.85 
Production (tonne) 1702 22725.76 40335.87 0 188216 
Total Export (tonne) 1702 15361.33 23593.29 0 132921 
Domestic Trade (tonne) 1702 17195.93 30895.79 0 144446 
Φij 1683 666127.50 4076545 0 79400000 
DISTij (kilometers) 1702 2925.47 3754.69 160.93 17625.29 
Dii (kilometers) 1702 394.69 458.55 66.78 1853.80 
Djj (kilometers) 1702 246.29 137.23 66.78 462.52 
MRPL 1702 0.18 0.15 0 0.30 
Tariff  1702 0.028 0.053 0 0.14 
Exchange Rate index 1702 1.01 0.14 0.65 2.18 
EU 1702 0.72 0.45 0 1 
zero observations 408 
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Table 3-4. Data Summary of “phi-ness” Gravity Model with Developing Countries 
Country 
Group Variable Observation Mean Variance Min Max 
Developing  
Countries 
xij (thousand $) 2360 9853830 25100000 17 341000000 
xji (thousand $) 571 2197527 9471805 3 102000000 
xii (thousand $) 2360 672.85 1520.87 0 11454.08 
xjj (thousand $) 2360 37.78 37.45 0.70 150.26 
cif ($/kg) 2360 5.47 8.48 0.02 164.70 
Production (tonne) 2360 71359.17 258171.40 0 2582651.00 
Total Export (tonne) 2360 17609.53 39160.51 0 252949.00 
Domestic Trade (tonne) 2360 54578.32 236029.00 0 2414490.00 
Φij 2358 26792.42 827421.00 0 39300000.00 
DISTij (kilometers) 2360 7552.46 3023.61 451.42 16870.66 
Dii (kilometers) 2360 402.86 305.29 8.45 1366.11 
Djj (kilometers) 2360 272.24 144.93 66.78 462.52 
MRPL 2360 0.17 0.020 0 0.30 
Tariff  2360 0.090 0.060 0 0.14 
Exchange Rate index 2360 1.56 1.15 0.62 8.51 
EU 2360 0.014 0.12 0 1 
zero observations 1787 
     
The aggregated CIF is constructed as the sum of unit CIF weighted by the quantities of 
imported frozen and non-frozen shrimp products. The aggregated CIF is measured in US 
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dollar per kilogram and is converted into dollar per ton when calculating total production 
value. Bilateral trade data, xij and xji, are taken from UN Comtrade Legacy Annual 
Database and measured in thousand dollars. Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 has 
detailed information on trade flow data used in this study. 
Information on Gravity variables, including bilateral distance Dij, unilateral distance Dii 
and Djj, common land board BORDij, common official language LANGij, and colonized 
by the same power COLYij are obtained from the CEPII Gravity Database. Data on 
distances are measured in kilometers. The weighted average distance between country i 
and j is used as the bilateral distance, which provides current population figures and 
geographic coordinates for cities, towns and places of all countries. The unilateral 
distance is determined by the internal distance of country i or j, which measures the 
average distance between consumers and producers in a country. Head and Mayer (2002) 
present more details of the measure of bilateral distance and unilateral distance.  
Data on the export value and unit CIF are obtained for the frozen and non-frozen 
categories from the UN Comtrade Legacy Annual Database. Total export value is the sum 
of export values of frozen and non-frozen shrimp and is measured in thousand dollars.  
Data for exchange rates are obtained from the database of World Development Indicators. 
The real exchange rate, which is calculated as the local currency units relative to the U.S. 
dollar based on annual average is converted into an index form in order to avoid the 
changing scale among countries; this makes exchange rate changes comparable among 
countries. The base year for the exchange rate is 2000.  
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Tariff data are obtained from Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS). The import 
weighted average tariff rate for shrimp and pawns, which is measured in percentage and 
is the average tariff rates of frozen and non-frozen shrimp products weighted by the 
country's own imports from the world in the same or nearest available year, is used.  The 
tariff rate for each shrimp product is itself a simple average rate of included tariff lines.  
The data of MRPL is summarized from the Official Journal of the European 
Communities: Commission Decision 2002/657/EC, Commission Decision 2003/181/EC, 
Commission Decision 2005/34/EC and the study of Hanekamp and Calabrese (2007).  
Before assigning values for EU variable, the effective time of each European country’s 
membership as the exporter is carefully verified, because member countries may not join 
in EU on the same date. 
3.4.2 Data Description of Nested CES Model 
In order to keep the consistent linkage with “phi-ness” GM, the same 12 EU countries 
and the same time span from 2002 to 2010 are adopted in CES analysis. The sample 
panel is balanced with 108 observations. Table 3-5 provides detailed information on the 
data used in the nested CES model. 
The domestic supply of shrimp products D is estimated as total shrimp production minus 
exports. The export quantity is the sum of exported frozen and non frozen shrimp 
products. PD is estimated as the aggregated CIF and is constructed in the same way as for 
the “phi-ness” GM. IE and II are estimated by summing the quantity of frozen and non-
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frozen shrimp products that are imported from developed countries and developing 
countries, respectively. 
Table 3-5. Data Summary of Nested CES Model 
Variable Observation Mean Variance Min Max 
PD ($/kg) 108 6.84 1.97 2.077 11.62 
Production (tonnes) 108 6833.19 7067.74 83 35267 
Total Export (tonnes) 108 20066.92 26342.87 368 132921 
Domestic Supply (tonnes) 108 5058.32 5608.37 25 25943 
IE (tonnes) 108 12500 7452.26 1198.33 36400 
II (tonnes) 108 36300 38300 124.53 155000 
PI ($/kg) 108 6.73 1.67 1.86 9.76 
PE ($/kg) 108 7.21 2.091 2.40 11.62 
Total Consumption (tonnes) 108 3568.65 3589.42 87 13102 
M 108 336.45 298.042 10.77 1505.53 
MI (million $) 108 301 287 10.60 1280 
HICP 108 100.0835 11.1164 75.01 135.7 
Effect. Exch. Rate index 108 97.91929 6.654906 78.01 116.35 
Fleet 108 153186 124025.9 15812 550340 
Wage Index 108 104.6962 7.109592 92.46546 134.3878 
Shrimp/Other. Crust.  Index 108 1.60 0.72 -0.043 3.57 
EU Real GDP index 108 113.38 10.40 84.90 135.60 
EU Population ( millions) 108 31.40 27.20 39.32 82.50 
 
Data on total production, export quantity and import quantity of frozen and non-frozen 
shrimp products are obtained from the database of FAO Global Production and are 
measured in tons. The value of PE and PI is estimated as the aggregated CIF price of 
shrimp products imported from developed countries and developing countries, 
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respectively. The aggregated CIF price is obtained by dividing the sum of imported value 
of frozen and non-frozen products by the sum of imported quantity. Each of the 
aggregated CIF price is measured in dollars per kilogram and transformed into dollar per 
ton in the analysis. The value of frozen and non-frozen products imported from 
developed and developing countries are obtained from the UN Comtrade Legacy Annual 
Database and are measured in thousand dollars.  
The income spent on shrimp consumption is used as the imperfect proxy of income 
budget M. The shrimp consumption is estimated as total production plus total imports 
minus total exports, and includes both industrial and consumer. The total import value of 
shrimp products is used to estimate MI. 
In order to estimate equation (3-34) with N3SLS, seven instrumental variables are used in 
the analysis.  They are Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs), Fish Fleeting, 
Real Effective Exchange Rates, Average Annual Wage index, the Price index of Shrimp 
to Other Crustacean, Real GDP and Population of importers. Data on HICP, Fish Fleeting 
Real GDP index with 2000 as the base year and average Population are obtained from 
EUROSTAT. HICP is the a set of consumer price indices (CPIs) calculated according to a 
harmonized approach and measures the change over time of the prices of consumer goods 
and services acquired by households. The fishing fleet reflects the size of fleet and the 
management of fishing capacity. Fishing Fleet is measured in vessels but it is converted 
into an index form with a 2000 base in order to avoid the changing scale among 
countries. The Real Effective Exchange Rate is also obtained from EUROSTAT. The 
index of real effective exchange rate that uses the deflator of unit labor costs in the total 
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economy is used in the analysis with 2005 as the base year. Data on wages is obtained in 
index form from the OECD Labor Average Annual Wages Database with 2000 as the 
base. The Price Ratio of Shrimp to Other Crustacean is calculated as dividing the 
aggregated CIF of shrimp by the aggregated CIF of other crustacean. Unit CIF values are 
obtained from the UN Comtrade database and each aggregated CIF value is calculated as 
total import value divided by total import quantity. The index of this ratio is calculated 
with 2002 as the base.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section presents the analysis of how the enforcement of MRPL affects the trading of 
shrimp products between EU members and the rest of the world, and the resulting 
changes in the EU domestic welfare and international welfare. The analysis begins with 
explaining the results of the Gravity Model (GM) and examines the relationships between 
trade cost variables and trade integrations. Then, based on the GM results, this research 
quantifies the change to consumer and supplier behavior and the welfare changes of EU 
consumers and suppliers as well as foreign suppliers from developed countries and 
developing countries.  
Before starting the analysis, it is better to clarify the relationship between the strictness of 
food safety standards and the level of MRPL. As stated before, the strictness of the 
MRPL standard depends on the level of MRPL set by EU --the lower the level, the 
stricter the standard. In addition, the MRPL regulation was first enforced in 2002 and 
there is no legitimate information about this standard before 2002. In this case, this 
dissertation concentrates only on the time span from 2002 to 2010, when the MRPL was 
in effect. As the EU relieved the strictness of food safety standard by increasing MRPL 
from zero to 0.3 ppb in 2005, the effects of standard measured in this research are based 
on analyzing trade and welfare changes caused by MRPL level change. The baseline is 0 
before 2005 and 0.3 ppb in 2005 and thereafter and the new scenario is defined as 
lowering MRPL to zero level from 2002. 
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4.1 MRPL Effects on Trade 
Table 4-1 presents the estimation results for the three groups of countries with two 
estimation methods. For each table the first column is the typical “phi-ness” gravity 
model specification (equation (3-14)) using OLS, which excludes zero-valued trade 
observations. The second column is the PPML estimation (equation (3-15)) which 
includes zero observations to reduce potential bias. The Table 4-1 presents the estimated 
coefficients α and λ of trade cost variables, which are the product of elasticities of 
substitution (1-σ) and the “true” elasticities of trade costs; while Table 4-2 presents the 
“true” elasticities of trade costs after removing the effect of elasticities of substitution. 
The values of elasticities of substitution are estimated based on the nested CES model, 
which will be discussed in detail later. 
4.1.1 Comparison between OLS and PPML 
The difference in results between the OLS and PPML method highlights the effects of a 
different functional form and the inclusion of zero observations. All three country groups 
had a large portion of zero-valued observations, so the estimation differed between the 
two methods in terms of coefficients and significance. The sign of exchange rate changes 
to negative with the PPML method; a negative sign is consistent with theoretical 
expectations and previous empirical results.  
The significance of the colony coefficient is also highlighted under the PPML method for 
all countries and developed countries. Although the sign for the colony coefficient is 
negative for developing countries, the effect is insignificant.  
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Table 4-1. PPML and OLS with “phi-ness” GM Estimation of Effects of MRPL on EU 
Shrimp Imports 
  
All 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
 
Variables OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML 
Estimated 
trade cost 
coefficients 
α and λ 
lnDISTij -2.40* -1.56* -4.19* -1.57* -4.09* -4.78* 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.81) (1.15) 
lnDii 0.43* 1.55* 0.96* 1.76* 6.82* 1.85* 
 
(0.10) (0.24) (0.15) (0.19) (1.57) (0.53) 
lnDjj 0.69* 0.19 0.96* 0.45** 0.17 0.37* 
 
(0.13) (0.27) (0.16) (0.19) (0.55) (0.14) 
lnEXCHijt 0.30 -0.89** 1.11 -1.00 0.04 -6.19** 
 
(0.30) (0.39) (0.98) (1.23) (0.80) (3.12) 
MRPLt 0.04 2.10* 0.14 1.98** 0.94 3.26*** 
 
(0.61) (0.71) (0.66) (0.71) (1.01) (2.024) 
LANGij 2.73* 2.19* 0.75 2.69* 0.52 2.12 
 
(0.38) (0.49) (0.46) (0.45) (0.70) (1.66) 
COLYij -0.10 0.79*** 0.60 0.68*** 0.16 -0.93 
 
(0.40) (0.42) (0.50) (0.41) (0.63) (1.20) 
BORDij 2.24* 0.28 1.66* 0.039 -1.77 1.60 
 
(0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (1.78) (3.23) 
EUit 1.05* 1.87* 2.06* 4.87* -2.31*** -6.37* 
 
(0.33) (0.67) (0.43) (0.62) (1.23) (1.18) 
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Table 4-1. PPML and OLS with “phi-ness” GM Estimation of Effects of MRPL on EU 
Shrimp Imports (Continued) 
  
All 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
 
Variables OLS PPML OLS PPML OLS PPML 
Estimated 
trade cost 
coefficients 
α and λ 
TARijt -0.0096 -0.029 -0.052** -0.15* -0.0004 -0.044* 
 
(2.07) (2.86) (2.85) (2.24) (5.96) (1.55) 
Constant 17.53* 11.70* 25.13* 6.28** 12.54 50.97* 
 
(1.36) (2.69) (1.63) (2.48) (1.08) (10.89) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.55 0.39 
Note: *, ** and ** * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
There were fewer zero observations with the developed country data set. The main 
differences in estimates from the OLS model are the different coefficient magnitudes 
compared with the PPML model. The sign of lnEXCH changes to negative, which is 
consistent with expectations. The significance levels for the coefficients on LANG, 
COLY and BORD change while the coefficient signs remain unchanged (consistent with 
expectation). 
As stated before, the results of the PPML model are expected to be more reliable because 
they avoid the bias problems from using the log model and excluding zero observations. 
Considering the fact that developing countries and all countries have much higher ratios 
of zero-valued observations than developed countries, the conclusion is that the results of 
OLS may be more biased for these country categories (where there is a larger portion of 
zero observations). Thus, the PPML results are more reliable in this situation. 
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4.1.2 MRPL Effects 
As stated before, lower MRPLs mean stricter food standards. In this case, a negative 
coefficient for MRPL indicates that higher standards decrease trade integration, Φ, while 
a positive coefficient indicates higher standards increase trade integration. 
This study hypothesizes that everything else equal, the introduction of stricter MRPL has 
a significant and negative impact on the trade integration for the EU shrimp market. The 
PPML model shows that the MRPL variable has a significant and positive coefficient for 
the all country group. This indicates that lowering the MRPL would decrease the trade 
between the EU and trading partners. Thus the requirement of MRPL does impede the 
trade integration. In this case, this result supports the first hypothesis by verifying that the 
stricter percentage MRPL standard induces a decrease of foreign trade flows over 
domestic trade of shrimp products. 
The results in Table 4-1 fail to reject the second hypothesis that MRPL impacts depend 
on the status of economic condition in exporting countries. The MRPL variable has a 
positive coefficient which is statistically significant for all three country groups. This 
result infers that the lowering MRPL would significantly reduce the trade integration 
between the EU and exporters in developing countries and developed countries. In other 
words, EU members increase the portion of bilateral trade with developing and developed 
countries when compared with the domestic trade after the MRPL level is increased. The 
estimated results have different magnitudes for the MRPL coefficient for developed and 
developing countries with coefficients of 1.98 and 3.26, respectively. Developing country 
exports are more sensitive to MRPL changes than developed country exports. 
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Table 4-2. “True” Elasticities of Proxy Variables with Respect to Trade Costs 
 All 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
 Variables OLS PPML OLS OLS PPML OLS 
True 
trade 
cost μ 
lnDISTij 0.63 0.41 0.62 0.23 0.61 0.71 
lnDii 0.22 0.81 0.28 0.52 2.02 0.55 
lnDjj 0.36 0.10 0.28 0.133 0.049 -1.10 
lnEXCHijt -0.08 0.23 -0.16 0.15 0.0061 0.92 
MRPLt -0.01 -0.55 -0.02 -0.29 -0.14 -0.85 
LANGij -0.72 -0.57 -0.11 -0.40 -0.077 -0.31 
COLYij 0.03 -0.21 -0.09 -0.10 -0.023 0.14 
BORDij -0.59 -0.07 -0.25 -0.01 0.26 -2.37 
EUit -0.28 -0.49 -0.30 -0.72 0.34 0.94 
TARijt 0.25 0.76 0.77 2.28 0.0060 0.66 
 
As stated before, the estimated coefficient of MRPL reflects the influence of two parts: 
the elasticity of substitution σ and the elasticity of “true” trade cost μ. The estimations of 
σ1 and σ2 are shown in the later section of CES model results. The results in Table 4-2 
indicate that for developing countries, a 0.1 ppb increase in MRPL level would decreases 
the bilateral trading cost by 8.5% (the true trading cost elasticity 0.85*0.1*100%) and 
increases the trade integration by 33% (0.1*3.26*100%). Most importantly, for the all 
country group, if the MRPL was originally set as 0.3 ppb in 2002, the average MRPL 
would increase from 0.18 to 0.12. This level increase would reduce trade cost by about 
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10.2% (0.12*0.85*100%), and increase Φ by over 25% (0.12*2.1*100%). This 
magnitude of Φ changes with MRPL is far from negligible and suggests that by shifting 
from zero tolerance, EU dramatically increased its potential for seafood trade with other 
countries. 
A number of studies have showed empirically that stricter standards act as a barrier to 
exports from developing countries (Baylis, Nogueira and Pace 2011, Anders and Caswell 
2009 and Nguyen and Wilson 2009) and it is conceptually reasoned that exports from 
developed countries should be less affected. These results support existing empirical 
research by verifying that the MRPL dramatically reduces EU shrimp imports from 
developing countries compared with developed countries. 
4.1.3 Gravity Trading Costs Variables 
Based on the estimated results of the PPML model, most gravity variables have 
significant explanatory power and have signs that are consistent with expectation. 
Bilateral distance and domestic distance have significant effects for all three countries 
groups. The coefficient for colony in the estimation for the developing country group is 
negative but is not statistically significant. The average domestic distance of the exporter 
and language have significant impacts on developing and developed countries in the 
PPML models. Language, colony and common border show no significant explanatory 
effects for developing countries in the PPML model. 
As shown in Table 4-1, the coefficient of bilateral distance and domestic distance of 
exporter are statistically different from zero for all three country groups. Trade 
integrations decrease with international distances, DISTij, and increase with the average 
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domestic distances of exporter Dii. As shown in Table 4-2, one percentage point increase 
in bilateral distance would reduce trade integration for all countries by 1.56%, developed 
countries by 1.57% and developing countries by 4.78%. The domestic distance represents 
the trade cost of domestic trade flows, such as transportation costs. Higher domestic trade 
cost infers that consumers are more likely to import shrimp. A one percentage increase in 
the exporter’s domestic distance would increase the trade integration by 1.55%, 1.76%, 
and 1.85%, respectively, for all countries, developed countries and developing countries. 
The domestic distances of the importer Dii has a significant effect on trade integrations 
for the developed and developing country groups, but not the all country group.  
Moreover, for all exporters and developed countries, trade integrations are, respectively, 
2.19 and 2.69 percent higher between EU and countries that speak the same language. 
For countries sharing a colonial relationship with EU members, trade integrations are, 
respectively, 0.79 and 0.68 percent higher for all-country and developed country 
categories.  
4.1.4 Other Bilateral Costs Variables 
Based on the results of PPML model, the estimated coefficients of the exchange rate 
variable have signs that are consistent with expectation --they are negative and 
statistically significant for developing countries. The results indicate that a one 
percentage increase in the exchange rate is associated with a 0.89 percent and 6.19 
percentage decrease in trade integration of all-country and developing-country groups, 
respectively.  
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The tariff (TAR) coefficient is significant and negative for exports from all three groups 
of countries, which is consistent with expectation. The elasticities of tariff are about 
14.31% (exp (-0.15)-1) for developed countries, and 4.31% (exp (-0.044)-1) for 
developing countries, meaning that the trade integrations between the EU and those 
countries reduce by 100% if the annual average tariff rate increase by one unit. 
 The dummy variable identifying EU exporters has significant effects on trade integration 
for all three country groups, which is expected due to no tariffs and harmonized 
standards. The trade integration for EU exporters is 1.87% and 4.87% higher, 
respectively, than for non EU exporters in all- and developed-country groups; and it is 
6.37% lower than non EU exporters in developing countries.  
4.2 MRPL Effects on Welfare Change 
In this section, the nested CES model is used to investigate the effects of MRPL on the 
demand and supply for the EU and its trade partners in developing and developed 
countries. The estimated parameters from applying the nested CES model are discussed 
first and then welfare changes are estimated for EU consumers and suppliers caused by 
lowering MRPL using the GM and nested CES.  
4.2.1 Parameter Estimation 
The parameters discussed in this section are used to setup the initial demand and supply 
functions that incorporate the MRPL changes in 2005.  
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4.2.1.1 Consumer’s Model 
The parameters of consumers’ model are estimated based on two equations (3-20a) and 
(3-20b). Non-linear three stage least squares regression (N3SLS) is used to estimate 
equations (3-20) since the right-hand side variables - MRPL, ln(PI/PE) and ln(PE/PD) - are 
endogenously determined. Equation (3-20a) and (3-20b) are estimated simultaneously by 
using SAS command of proc model and 3SLS. Fixed country effects are also introduced 
to control for systematic differences across different importing countries.  
As Kelejian (1971) and Quandt (1975) indicate, the number of Instrument Variables (IV) 
chosen must be greater than or equal to the number of estimated parameters in any 
equation; otherwise some of the parameters cannot be identified. In addition to import 
country fixed effects, seven linearly independent instruments are included that represent 
different indicators affecting the demand and supply of shrimp products. The fish and 
seafood part of Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs) is used to represent the 
price indicator. The Average Annual Wage Index is used to indicate the income impact. 
The Real Effective Exchange Rate Index represents the financial impact. The Fish 
Fleeting Index measures the total average annual number of fishing vessels and infers the 
effect of fishery support. The Price Ratio of Shrimp to Other Crustaceans reflects the 
substitution effects between shrimp and other crustaceans. Real GDP and population of 
importers represent the condition of EU society. 
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Table 4-3.Estimated Parameters of the Nested CES Model Consumer and Supply 
Functions 
Model Parameter Value Standard Error 
Consumer 
model 
σ1 2.91 2.12 
σ2 4.38* 0.57 
φI 0.47* 0.012 
φD 0.027 0.054 
ηI 0.12** 0.057 
ηD -0.0067 0.0085 
 
βD 0.027 - 
 
βI 0.51 - 
Supplier 
model 
γD 530.23* 79.07 
γE 1290.15* 117347 
γI 3823.36* 533707 
Note: *, ** and ***respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Table 4-3 presents the estimated parameters for the nested CES model. The coefficient η 
captures the change in consumer confidence for shrimp products from different origins. 
The results show that ηI is statistically significant and positive, indicating that the 
increasing the MRPL standard (making it more lax) increases EU consumer confidence in 
shrimp imported from developed countries compared to developing countries. The 
parameter of confidence, βI, increases from 0.47 to 0.51, as shown in Table 4-3, which 
means that increasing the MRPL has a significant demand-enhancing effect on imported 
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shrimp products from developed countries. The significant change in the parameter of 
confidence indicates that it is necessary to account for the changing consumer confidence 
caused by the MRPL standard, and a nested CES function can be used in the analysis.  
In addition, the assumption of heterogeneity for shrimp imported from developed and 
developing countries, which is used in this dissertation, is verified with the nested CES 
estimation as the demands of the two products with different origin varies with βI. 
The coefficient ηD is negative and statistically insignificant, which indicates that the 
implementation of a MRPL standard did not change consumer confidence between 
domestic and foreign shrimp products. The value of βD is much lower than βI, which 
infers that consumers have more confidence in foreign shrimp than domestic shrimp. The 
fact that EU consumption of shrimp is mainly from imports explains the estimation of βD 
and ηD. 
As stated in section 3.4.3, the changes in consumer behavior caused by enforcing the 
MRPL could indirectly reflect the effect of MRPL on trade. The estimation of ηI and βI 
are consistent with the estimation of MRPL effects on trade integrations. The reduction of 
MRPL level would significantly reduce consumer confidence in shrimp imported from 
developing countries. The reduction of confidence is reflected by the consumption 
reduction effects on trade flows with developing countries. The MRPL standard presents 
statistically significant and negative effects on trade integrations between EU and 
developing countries. The stricter the standard, the less trade integration is present. In 
consumers’ part, this significant effect is reflected by the indication that MRPL 
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dramatically affects consumers’ confidence in shrimp imported from developing 
countries. 
The parameter σ measures the elasticity of substitution among variables in the CES utility 
function. The values of σ1 that is used to calculate the “true” trade costs of aggregated 
country group and σ2 used for developed and developing country groups in Table 4-2. 
The estimated values of σ1 and σ2 are greater than one, which are consistent with the 
assumptions in the CES model. In addition, the statistical significance of σ2 indicates that 
the substitution between shrimp imported from developed and developing countries is 
significant when the MRPL is in effect. The results also show that σ2 is larger than σ1, 
which means that the substitution between shrimp from developed countries and 
developing countries is larger than the substitution between domestic shrimp and foreign 
shrimp. 
4.2.1.2  Supplier Model 
The values of γ are shown in the last three rows of Table 4-3. As discussed in section 
3.3.3, the changes in γ when considering the effects of varying the MRPL can be 
retrieved from the estimation of MRPL coefficient in the “phi-ness” GM with PPML. The 
results show that implementation of the MRPL has significant effects on trade 
integrations of developing country group and developed country group. Thus the linkage 
function of GM and welfare change, (equation (3-30a) and (3-30b)) is used to capture the 
changes of γI and γE. Further, the domestic supply function is assumed unaffected by 
MRPL changes so γD stays unchanged in the welfare analysis.  
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 An unchanged domestic supply function, D, does not mean that domestic supply doesn’t 
change with the new price, PD1, and new quantities D1 at the equilibrium; it means that 
the domestic curve does not shift with the changed MRPL standard. As the results 
indicate, consumer confidence in shrimp products imported from developed countries and 
developing countries changes, so the demand function also changes with a differing 
MRPL requirement. In this case, PD1and D1 change too.  
4.2.2 Welfare Change Analysis 
The baseline for the welfare analysis is the MRPL defined as 0.3 ppb in 2005 and 
thereafter (time 0). The new scenario considers lowering MRPL to zero again in 2005 
(time 1).   
4.2.2.1 Changes of Demand and Supply Functions 
In order to calculate the new equilibrium, consumers in the EU are assumed to spend the 
same amount of money on shrimp products. The budget variables, M and MI, remain 
unchanged in the analysis. Since the EU shifted away from zero tolerance in 2005, the 
average prices, quantities, and budgets for 2005 are the baseline to calibrate the new 
parameters assuming that the EU still enforced a zero tolerance policy. The mean values 
of the key variables and parameters used in the calibration are listed in the first column of 
Table 4-4. 
The first step in calculating welfare changes is to obtain the new equilibrium prices PD1, 
PE1and PI1, as well as the quantities D1, IE1and II1 after implementing the MRPL 
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requirement at time 1. Equations (3-21), (3-24) and (3-30) are used to determine the new 
equilibrium parameters. 
Table 4-4. Values of Parameters for Calibrated Model, in 2005 
Parameters Value with 
MRPL=0.3 
Value with 
MRPL=0 
Changes in 
Value 
Change 
in % 
MRPL (ppb) 0.3 0 -0.30 
 βD at 2005 0.027 0.027 0.00 0.00 
βI at 2005 0.51 0.47 -0.04 -7.84 
Average D (in tonne) 5880.08 6891.21 1011.13 17.20 
Average II (in tonne) 34915.49 6369.76 -28545.73 -81.76 
Average IE (in tonne) 13731.37 11709.02 -2022.35 -14.73 
Average PD (in $/kg) 6.78 13.00 6.22 91.67 
Average PE (in $/kg) 7.06 13.00 5.93 83.98 
Average PI (in $/kg) 6.74 13.00 6.26 92.85 
γD 530.23 530.23 0.00 0.00 
γE 1290.15 900.93 -389.22 -30.17 
γI 3823.36 490.11 -3333.25 -87.18 
Average MI (in thousand $) 290430.02 290430.02 0.00 0.00 
Average M (in thousand $) 325225.14 325225.14 0.00 0.00 
Total Domestic Trade 39870.78 89562.69 49691.91 124.63 
Trade with Developed Country 97002.56 152178.08 55175.53 56.88 
Trade with Developing Country 235299.74 82785.56 -152514.18 -64.82 
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As stated before, the corresponding equation in (3-30) can only be used in the welfare 
analysis of MRPL if the standard has a significant effect. Equations (3-21), (3-24), the 
market equilibrium conditions of (3-25), and (3-30) constitute the calibrated model 
system, which is used to calculate the parameter γI, γE and the new price and quantities of 
domestic and foreign supply from developed and developing countries. The new values 
of these parameters are listed in the second column of Table 4-4. The baseline scenario 
for comparison is that MRPL set as 0.3 ppb, which is the initial situation of calibration. 
The estimations in Table 4-4 indicate that if the EU still followed a zero tolerance policy, 
consumer confidence in shrimp imported from developed countries would decrease to 
0.47. The decreased confidence may lead to less demand for imported shrimp from 
developed countries. However, the estimation indicates a significant increase in imports 
from developed countries. Based on demand function of IE (equation (3-21b)), the 
decreased βI leads the demand function of IE to downwardly rotate; while the dramatic 
increase in import price with developing countries (an increase of 92.85%), PI, pushes the 
demand function of  IE upward. As a large consumer, the EU has huge demand for 
shrimp. The importing price for developing counties would rise considerably if the EU 
continued a zero tolerance policy. This would induce an increase in the demand for 
shrimp from developed countries. In addition, the domestic demand quantity would 
increase by about 17% and the quantity demanded of shrimp from developing countries 
would sharply decrease if the MRPL was set at zero.  
If the EU still followed a zero tolerance policy, both the value of domestic trade and 
imports from developed countries would increase (by 124.63% and 56.88%, 
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respectively). Thus, for suppliers from developed countries, the increase in price would 
overweigh the decrease in quantity and push up the trade value of domestic demand. For 
EU domestic suppliers, the rising price and quantity would contribute to the increase in 
trade integration. Trade with developing countries would suffer a remarkable reduction. 
Although the price would increase over 92%, the decrease in quantity would exceed the 
increase in price and causes a 64.84% decrease in trade value. The changes in supply 
from developing countries also verify the estimation from the GM that stricter MRPL 
presents significant and negative effects on trade integrations with developing countries. 
Table 4-4 shows that the coefficient of the supply function of developing country would 
decrease by 87% if MRPL was set at zero. The changes infer that the supply function for 
developing countries rotates downward after the EU raises the MRPL to 0.3 ppb. In 
addition, with an increased MRPL, the price, PI, sharply falls from 13 to 6.74 and the 
price of domestic supply and trade from developed countries also decrease. 
4.2.2.2 Changes of Welfare 
Table 4-5 presents the ex ante estimations of welfare in the EU for 2005 with two MRPL 
levels, 0.3 and 0. The table focuses on the impact of the MRPL increase in 2005 and 
presents the changes in domestic consumer surplus, domestic producer surplus, total EU 
welfare (the sum of the former two), and foreign producer surplus based on economic 
status.  
The results show that changing the MRPL for the EU from zero to 0.3 improved domestic 
customer welfare. The relief of MRPL requirement increases the total consumer surplus 
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by 45,836. This result infers that domestic consumers benefit from the reduction in price 
linked to less strict standards comes from the increase in MRPL.  However, domestic 
producers gain more surpluses with a zero MRPL than with a 0.3 MRPL. Increasing the 
MRPL has a large negative effect on domestic producer prices that is not overcome by 
increased quantity sale. The total EU domestic surplus is higher with the MRPL at 0.3. 
This indicates that the benefit for domestic consumers outweigh the loss for domestic 
suppliers from less strict standards. The EU government transfers welfare from producers 
to consumers by increasing the level of MRPL but total domestic welfare increases. 
Table 4-5. Welfare Changes from an Increase in the MRPL for 2005  
Welfare MRPL=0.3 MRPL= 0 Change in Value 
Change in 
% 
Consumers 
Overall Utility 163,984 118,148 -45,836 -27.95 
Utility of Foreign Shrimp 161,346 114,208 -47,138 -29.22 
Domestic Supplier 19,935 44,781 24,846 124.63 
Total EU Domestic Welfare 183,919 162,930 -20,990 -11.41 
Suppliers in Developed Countries 48,501 76,089 27,588 56.88 
Suppliers in Developing Countries 117.650 46,386 -71,264 -60.57 
Total Foreign Supplier 166,151 41,393 -124,758 -75.09 
Total World Surplus 350,070 204,322 -145,748 -41.63 
 
If the MRPL is set at zero, foreign suppliers in developed countries would benefit from 
the increased price while those in developing countries would suffer from the 
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considerable loss in imports, despite the price increase. Total surplus for foreign suppliers 
would decrease by 75.09% because most imports come from developing countries.  The 
analysis indicates that the increased MRPL transfers surplus from suppliers in developed 
countries to those in developing countries and dramatically increases the welfare of 
suppliers in developing countries (and total foreign suppliers). 
Total world welfare includes total EU domestic surplus and total foreign surplus. The 
results show that by increasing MRPL, the EU dramatically improves total international 
surplus. 
In sum, the analysis shows that increasing the MRPL from zero benefits consumers and 
suppliers in general. By relieving the restrictive MRPL, total domestic welfare in the EU 
improves by shifting the surplus from domestic suppliers to domestic consumers. 
Suppliers in developing countries also benefit from the increase level of MRPL, while 
those in developed countries suffer a welfare loss. Total foreign supplier welfare and total 
world welfare improves with the MRPL increase. These analyses indicate that EU 
standards were originally too tough because there was a net welfare increase of total 
international welfare and total EU domestic welfare when the MRPL went from 0 to 0.3. 
Copyright © Xiaoqian Li 2014  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research explores the use of gravity model in a welfare analysis for a food safety 
standard. For this purpose, this research employs the monopolistic competition gravity 
framework by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and connects it to the nested CES 
model of consumer and supplier behavior. This research verifies that the consumer utility 
function used for welfare analysis follows the specific CES form in order to use the GM 
in welfare analysis and then derives the linkage between the CES and GM. This research 
partitions the policy variable from its perfect correlate with time and country fixed effects 
by using the “phi-ness” index with the GM, and zero observations are handled by 
adopting the PPML method.  
This research measures the impact of MRPL standards for the EU shrimp market on trade 
and welfare. Heterogeneity in shrimp products is handled by considering price 
differences between shrimp products imported from developed countries and developing 
countries in the CES model and specifying different MRPL effects on trade with these 
two groups of exporters. The possible effect of MRPL on consumer behavior is 
considered by specifying the consumer confidence in products from different origins as a 
linear function of the EU MRPL standard.  
The results demonstrate that while the econometric estimation of the gravity equation 
shows a negative impact on EU trade, the welfare evaluations also show that a stricter 
standard would lead to a decrease in domestic welfare as well as international welfare. 
The analysis with domestic welfare justifies the EU’s policy on tightening the food safety 
standard on importing shrimps by protecting its domestic suppliers. However, EU 
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consumers would suffer from a welfare loss with stricter standards. This result infers that 
the zero tolerance policy violates the purpose of food safety standard that stricter standard 
should benefit consumers by providing food with higher quality, as it reduces consumers’ 
utilities. In addition, the stricter zero tolerance policy is shown to be too tough because 
there was a net welfare increase of total international welfare and total EU domestic 
welfare when the MRPL went from 0 to 0.3.  
The estimation for international welfare verifies the barriers that tighter food safety 
standards have on importing shrimps. Stricter standards do not necessarily mean domestic 
welfare losses but they do lead to international welfare losses. This is why the World 
Trade Organization is dedicated to eliminating the unnecessary strict standards among 
member countries in order to balance the welfare changes caused by standard conflicts. 
The results also show that with stricter standards, the welfare of suppliers from 
developing countries is severely reduced while suppliers from developed countries 
benefit. This analysis of foreign and international welfare supports the assertion of 
comparative advantage of developed countries over developing countries in international 
shrimp trade markets. Developing countries should increase their level of food safety by 
adopting advanced regulations or techniques in order to reduce the loss from trade 
reduction when they need to comply with stricter regulation requirements of importers. 
It was interesting to find that developing countries might benefit from the MRPL as the 
supplier surplus increased when MRPL increased from 0 to 0.3. Their products were 
suspect before the enforcement of MRPL in 2002 because of the detection of high hazard 
to human health. After the EU relieved the required level of MRPL, consumers bought 
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more shrimp products from developing countries. This research only uses data span from 
2002 to 2012 because of the absent legitimate information of MRPL level. Applying 
methods and using data before 2002 might show more about the effects on developing 
country. 
Some extensions could be integrated into the presented model. If the data is available, the 
different private standards applied by retail companies could be incorporated into the 
analysis in order capture the discrimination among standards effects. The analysis could 
also become dynamic. In addition, this research does not consider detailed factors 
affecting supplier behavior due to the limitation of data availability of the shrimp industry. 
Taking into account the changes of variables and fix costs caused by stricter effects may 
provide more information of ex ante analysis if related information is available in other 
industries. 
The results of this research also indicate that it is especially necessary for governments to 
examine the combination of gravity and welfare approaches when standards are analyzed.  
The gravity estimations help policy makers to know whether a standard really impacts 
trade and provides a basis for anticipating market reactions. Then the integration of 
market reactions into a welfare measure helps policy makers with information about the 
changes of domestic demand as well as domestic and foreign supply functions. The 
estimation of welfare variations helps policy makers assess the impacts of ex ante 
regulatory measures and changes before adjusting the strictness of safety regulations and 
standards.  
Copyright © Xiaoqian Li 2014 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I The Derivation of Gravity Model 
Consumers in country j maximize their CES utility:  
U = (∑ βicj
σ−1
σ
i )
σ
σ−1                                               (AI-1) 
Subject to the budget constraint: 
∑ pij ciji = yj                                                 (AI-2) 
Let pi denotes to the supply price in country i and tij is the trade costs factor between i and 
j. Assuming that for each good shipped from i to j the exporter incurs the export trade 
cost equal to tij-1 in a portion of pi, then  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 . The nominal 
export value from i to j is xij= pijcij , and the production value of goods in country i is 
picij. Assuming that the exporters in country i pass on these trade costs to importers in 
country j, trading costs are xij-picij= (tij-1)picij, The total income of region i is therefore 
yi = ∑ xij = ∑ pij cijjj                                               (AI-3) 
There is one more inherent assumption in equation (AI-3): the retail price that consumers 
in j spend on goods equals the import price pij.  
Maximizing utility in equation (AI-1) subject to the budget constraint, equation (AI-2), 
the Lagrangian is: 
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Max  (∑ βii cij
σ−1
σ )
σ
σ−1 − λ(∑ pij cij − yji )                                   (AI-4) 
The first order condition, the ith equation is 
�∑ βii cij
σ−1
σ �
σ
σ−1
βicij
−1
σ − τ ∙ pij = 0                                         (AI-5) 
Seting ∆= �∑ βii cij
σ−1
σ �
−1
σ
, then 
∆ ∙ βicij
−1
σ =  τ ∙ pij                                                    (AI-6) 
For ∀m ≠ n,           nth  equation
mth  equation
=
βn cnj
−1
σ
βm cmj
−1
σ
= pnj
pmj
                                (AI-7) 
The relationship between consumption of different residents in country j can be expressed 
as: 
cmj = cnj ∙ (
pnj
pmj
∙ βm
βn
)σ                                             (AI-8) 
Substituting 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗  into equation (AI-2), the budget constraint can be rewritten as: 
 
For ∀m ≠ n,  
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yj = � pij cij
j
= pnj cnj + � pmj cmj
i
m≠n
= pnj cnj + � cnj ∙ (pnj ∙
βm
βn
)σ ∙
i
m≠n
pmj 1−σ 
= pnj σcnj βn
−σ ∙ βn
σ pnj 1−σ + pnj σcnj βn
−σ ∙ � βm
σ ∙
i
m≠n
pmj 1−σ 
                         = pnj σcnj βn
−σ(βn
σ pnj 1−σ + � βm
σ
i
m≠n
pmj 1−σ)
= pnj σcnj βn
−σ[� βm
σ pmj 1−σ
m=n
+ � βm
σ
i
m≠n
pmj 1−σ] 
                       = cnj pnj σβn
−σ ∑ βm
σ �pmj �
1−σ
i                                                              (AI-9) 
So for ∀ 𝑖𝑖, the optimized consumption of country j’s output depends on the budget 
constraint yj, import price pij, and the distribution parameter β, as shown in equation (AI-
10). 
cij = yj
pij −σβi
σ
∑ βi
σ�pij �
1−σ
i
                                                 (AI-10)       
Substituting equation (AI-10), the nominal value of optimized exports from i to j,xij, can 
be rewritten as 
xij = pij cij =
yj βi
σ�pij �
1−σ
∑ βi
σ�pij �
1−σ
i
                                        (AI-11) 
Substituting the trade cost factor tij into equation (AI-11) by using pij = pitij, we get 
 
96 
xij = yj ∙
βi
σ�pi tij �
1−σ
∑ βi
σ�pi tij �
1−σ
i
                                            (AI-12) 
Seting Λj = [∑ βi
σ(pitij )1−σi ]1/(1−σ) , where Λ𝑗𝑗  represents the inward multilateral price 
resistance of country j, equation (AI-11) can be rewritten as 
xij = yj ∙ βi
σ(pi tij
Λj
)1−σ                                               (AI-13) 
After imposing the market clearing condition of equation (AI-3) by substituting the 
expression of xij in equation (AI-13), the income of country i is shown in the following 
expression (AI-14): 
yi = ∑ xij = ∑ yj ∙ βi
σ(pi tij
Λj
)1−σjj = βi
σpi
1−σ ∑ yj ∙ (tij Λj⁄ )1−σj ,∀ i      (AI-14) 
The scaled prices {𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖} can be solved as in equation (AI-15). 
βi
σpi
1−σ = yi
∑ yj ∙(
tij
Λj� )
1−σj
                                            (AI-15) 
We define the world nominal income as 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊 = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  and the income share as 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 =
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 𝑦𝑦𝑊𝑊⁄ . Then the nominal value of trade can be derived by substituting (AI-15) into (AI-
13):  
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xij = yj ∙ βi
σ(
pitij
Λj
)1−σ = βi
σpi
1−σ ∙ yj(
tij
Λj
)1−σ =
yi
∑ [(tij Λj⁄ )1−σyj]j
∙ �
tij
Λj
�
1−σ
∙ yj
= yiyj ∙ �
tij
Λj
�
1−σ
∙
1
∑ [(tij Λj⁄ )1−σ ∙ yW θj]j
=
yiyj
yw
∙ �
tij
Λj
�
1−σ
∙
1
∑ [(tij Λj⁄ )1−σ ∙ θj]j
 
            (AI-16) 
Where                            Πi = [∑ θj(tij Λj⁄ )1−σj ]1/(1−σ)                                           (AI-17) 
And                                Λj = [∑ βi
σ(pitij )1−σi ]1/(1−σ)                                             (AI-18) 
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Appendix II Functions Used to Calculate the Quantity and Price at New Scenario 
At the new scenario, the endogenous parameters including D, IE, II, P, TD, TS, γI or/and 
γE. The exogenous parameters of D0, IE0, II0, PD0, PI0, PE0 and γD are estimated by 
equation (3-21) and (3-24). Functions used in the calculation including: 
Demand functions: 
D(P, MI) = MI �
βD
1
1−βD
1�
σ1 1
P
[(βI
1)σ2 + (1 − βI
1)σ2 ]
1−σ1
σ2−1            (AII-1) 
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼) = 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼
(𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2
𝑃𝑃[(𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2 +(1−𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2 ]
                                (AII-2)   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑃𝑃,𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼) = 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼
(1−𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2
𝑃𝑃[(𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2 +(1−𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼
1)𝜎𝜎2 ]
                                  (AII-3)   
Supply functions: 
SD�P, γD� = γD P                                            (AII-4) 
SIE �P, γE� = γEP                                           (AII-5) 
SII�P, γI� = γIP                                            (AII-6) 
Market Equilibrium: 
TD = D1 + IE1 + II1 = MI �
βD
1
1−βD
1�
σ1 [(βI
1)σ2 +(1−βI
1)σ2 ]
1−σ1
σ2−1
P
+ MI
P
     (AII-7) 
TS = SD1 + SIE
1 + SII
1 = γD P + γE
1P + γI
1P                      (AII-8) 
TD = TS                                                         (AII-9) 
 
 
Mathematical linkage of MRPL measurement: 
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P−PE
0
PE
0 +
IE−IE
0
IE
0 −
P−PD
0
PD
0 −
D−D0
D0
= α6E∆MRPL                       (AII-10) 
And/or 
P−PI
0
PI
0 +
II−II
0
II
0 −
P−PD
0
PD
0 −
D−D0
D0
= α6I∆MRPL                        (AII-11) 
When α6 presents statistically significance, the corresponding linkage function is 
incorporated in welfare analysis.  
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